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Fair Trade /.../ is, fundamentally, a response to the failure of conventional trade to deliver sustainable livelihoods and 
development opportunities to people in the poorest countries of the world.  (FLO: 2009)  
 
In 1999, ten years after the dismantling of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) the price 
of the coffee 'C' contract1 started to plummet. It hit rock-bottom levels in October 2001, 
reaching 0.42$/lb., having lost almost 2/3 of its value in less than one year. Prices stayed low 
for three more years, only regaining more normal, pre-agreement price levels, in early 2005. 
(ICO: 2020a) 
The gravity of the situation did not escape the Executive Director of the International Coffee 
organization (ICO), who made the following statement at the UNCTAD XI conference in 
June 2004: 
 
It now seems likely that, if ways are not found to improve trading conditions in producer countries, this precious commodity 
[coffee], and what is worse, the human beings who grow it, will progressively decline to the point that, in a not too distant 
future, there may be insufficient coffee and certainly an insufficient quality range of coffee, to trade and to drink. (Osorio: 
2004, 1) 
 
Osorio continued by citing the then acting Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations,  
Louise Fréchette: 
 
The decline in prices for commodities such as coffee, which now receives roughly a third of the prices that prevailed in the 
mid-1990s, contributes to increased poverty and makes it more difficult to reach the millennium development goals. Lower 
revenue from coffee exports has also endangered the HIPC2 initiative.  (Osorio: 2004, 1-2) 
 
Thus, the recognition that coffee producers were engulfed in a crisis had dawned upon the 




1The Coffee C contract is the world benchmark for Arabica coffee, the most consumed and most traded coffee 
variety. (ICO: 2020a) 
2 HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries): countries with high levels of poverty and debt,  eligible for assistance 




This thesis answers the following question. 
What was the impact of Fair Trade coffee during the coffee crisis? 
To answer this question properly, the following questions will be answered to provide the 
proper context for the first question. 
What is Fair Trade? 
What factors led to the coffee crisis? 
What was the coffee market like in 1999-2004? 
 
The linkage between coffee and the Fair Trade3 (FT) movement has been a strong one ever 
since a Dutch Alternative Trade Organisation (ATO) imported the first Fair Trade coffee from 
cooperatives of small farmers in Guatemala in 1973. Since then, coffee has been the single 
most important Fair Trade good in the Fair Trade system. (WFTO: 2004) 
This thesis analyses how participation in the Fair Trade coffee network affected the small 
scale coffee farmers involved in FT during a time when producers of conventional coffee 
were increasingly cornered by falling coffee prices.   
 
This section continues by looking at the importance of trade in relation to developing 
countries, followed by a history of the FT movement, and is concluded by a definition and 
brief history of the coffee crisis.  
In section 2 the method used in this thesis will be discussed, namely the approach of a global 
value chain analysis (GVC), followed by notes on existing research on the topic of Fair Trade. 
Section 3 answers the question of what Fair Trade is, with Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (FLO) as its main focus – being the largest actor in the global FT system. 
In section 4 the international coffee market is analysed, with the coffee value chain taking 
centre stage, while section 5 presents the production and sales of FT coffee. 
In section 6 the mandatory organisation to which FT coffee producers have to belong – the 
cooperative – is presented and analysed. 
In section 7 four different case studies relating to Fair Trade coffee are presented. The first 
case study being a value chain analysis with a comparison between FT and conventional 
coffee during the coffee crisis. The three following case studies present the impact of FT 
 





coffee production in the cooperatives and families of Latin American coffee small farmers 
during the coffee crisis. 
Section 8 leans on the information set forth in section 7, and corroborated with evidence from 
other sources, analyses the economic and non-economic impact of Fair Trade coffee 
production in producing communities, with a focus on the time of the coffee crisis. 
Section 9 analyses the problems and limitations of Fair Trade. 
Section 10 discusses the findings of the thesis, and is followed by the conclusion in section 
11. 
 
This thesis was written mainly in the spring of 2006. Due to various personal reasons it was 
not submitted at the time, and was later been finalised in the fall of 2020. Thus, some sources 
can be outdated, but a valiant attempt has been made to update the core parts of the thesis. 
 
1.1. Why focus on trade? 
 
Many developing countries are economically dependent on a restricted number of commodity 
exports (in many cases agricultural exports). Thus, the impact of globalised and deregulated 
international trade on developing societies is hard to overemphasise. If one wants to reach a 
clearer understanding of the fundamental conditions in which people in developing countries 
live, the need to analyse the multifaceted phenomenon of international trade is urgent. 
Most development problems are complex, to some extent unquantifiable, and usually difficult 
to solve. The prevalent structures of global trade on the other hand, are mostly quantifiable 
and perhaps require less opaque solutions than problems concerning conflict management, 
ethnicity, culture or gender. The hope to find a potential vehicle for development, containing 
as much clarity and simplicity as possible, is one driving force behind this thesis. 
 
1.2. A brief history of the Fair Trade movement 
 
The Fair Trade movement grew out of the notion that trade practices have the potential to be 
unequal or even harmful to participating producers. 
As commodity export schemes collapsed during the 1980s, budding alternative trade 





Fair Trade is one attempt to alleviate the imbalances and deficiencies – informational, 
economical and power-related – faced by many commodity producers in the developing 
world. (Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) 
 
Even though the majority of the literature concerning Fair Trade includes a brief history of the 
movement, there is no unanimity concerning the history of Fair Trade, with some observers 
seeing the roots back in the 19th century and some in the genesis of alternative trading 
organisations of the mid-20th century. 
Moore (2004) traces the origins of the Fair Trade movement to the development of the co-
operative movement in the late nineteenth century. In his view the roots of the Fair Trade 
movement as it exists today, were the steps taken by the Mennonite Central Committee to 
initiate trade with poor communities in the South in the 1940s. The goal was to provide relief 
to refugees and other poverty stricken communities by selling their handicrafts to Northern 
markets. (Moore: 2004) In the 1960s, church and development organisations opened 
alternative shops in Europe with the aim of supporting Southern producer groups. In many 
cases this support was politically motivated, with the alternative shops being outlets for 
countries and producers marginalised by conventional trading channels, such as Sandinist 
Nicaragua.  While these shops initially focused on handicrafts, soon alternative trade 
expanded into food products. Alternative trade organisations also appeared in the United 
States in the 1960s and 1970s but they failed to acquire a similar market share as their 
European counterparts. (Raynolds, 2002; Moore: 2004; Mellor and Moore, 2005; Tallontire, 
2001b; Renard, 2001) 
  
In 1988, world coffee prices began a sharp descent, triggering the birth of the first Fair Trade 
certification initiative. It was branded Max Havelaar after a fictional Dutch character who 
opposed the exploitation of coffee pickers in Dutch colonies. The Max Havelaar label was 
created after a petition by a Mexican coffee cooperative who requested help in marketing its 
product in Europe. (Renard, 2003; Renard, 2001; Rice, 2001) 
The Max Havelaar label offered conventional coffee industry players the opportunity to adopt 
a standardized system of Fair Trade criteria, and in 1997, after almost a decade of strong 
growth, the existing 17 national Fair Trade organisations – European, North American and 
Japanese – formed a coordinating body, the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International 
(FLO) based in Bonn, thus joining the Max Havelaar label together with its counterparts in 




During the last 20 years global FT sales have maintained a strong pace of growth, easily 
reaching double digits annually, totaling an estimated €9.8 billion in 2018. (FLO:2019) 
 
1.3. A brief history and a definition of the coffee crisis 
 
After a price spike in 1997, coffee prices began an increasingly rapid descent, and during late 
2001, coffee prices had sunk to levels not seen in a hundred years. As coffee exports made up 
more than one-fifth of total exports in many coffee producing developing countries, and an 
estimated 100 million people were affected by the coffee trade, the abysmal prices caused 
many problems, from the displacement of wage workers and increasing poverty levels among 
small farmers, to bank failures and public protests. (Lewin et al.: 2004) 
 
Price volatility has always been a part of the coffee trade, especially since the fall of the 
International Coffee Agreement in 1989. Before the collapse of the ICA, price fluctuation 
usually depended on weather conditions (especially in Brazil, the biggest coffee producer). 
After the collapse of the ICA, Vietnam underwent a period of huge expansion in coffee 
production. This increased supply led to constant oversupply in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s (see figure 1), pressing down prices heavily. Another cause of the coffee crisis was the 
lack of information among small farmers, about coffee stocks, supply and demand, and 
consequently about future prices. 
 As coffee prices were quite high during the years leading up to the crisis (1994-1998), it 
incentivized growers to increase supply. However, as it takes 3-4 for a new coffee tree to 
produce cherries, this increased supply took effect after a long delay, when the market had 
turned and supply instead should have been decreased to clear the market. 


















(from Osorio: 2004) 
 
Even though there is no clear starting or end point to the coffee crisis, the choice has been 
made to demarcate the coffee crisis from the beginning of the year 1999 to the end of the year 
2004, as coffee prices plummeted from "normal" levels of 1-1.5$/lb. seen at the time of the 
ICA, to levels not even covering the cost of production in 2001 (see figure 2), even when 
assigning no monetary price to unpaid family work. (Ruben ed.: 2008) 
 





















2. Method and notes on existing research 
 
The main body of source material presented in this thesis was laboriously dug up from the 
depths of the internet in the spring of 2006. At the time I used the library services of the 
University of Helsinki, both through in person discussions with librarians as well as using the 
search functions of the Helka library system. Furthermore, as Fair Trade was such a niche 
research topic at the time, I also resorted to the use of both google and google scholar to find 
articles and other internet resources (web pages) relating to Fair Trade. After finding a (small) 
number of adequate articles, I followed the "reference trail", and in turn searched for the 
references that seemed relevant in the articles that I had found. 
At this time, research on the topic could be described as scarce, and to some extent as echoing 
the claims of Fair Trade organisations, rather than presenting well grounded, in depth analysis 
of the various facets of Fair Trade. Thus, the demarcation of the relevant source material was 
rather determined by necessity than by choice, with the accompanying problems that this 
entailed. 
Later on, during the fall of 2020 an expansion and an update of the original source material 
was made. New references were found through the use of the JSTOR and EconLit databases, 
focusing on the coffee (Fair Trade and conventional) value chain in Latin America in 1999-
2004. The reason why Latin America was chosen as a special focus, was that more than 80% 
of FT coffee was produced in this region at the time of the coffee crisis, with Mexico as the 
single largest producing nation. (Murray et al. 2003). Especially case studies with rigorous 
quantitative data were sought for, and some were found, such as Jaffee (2008 in Ruben ed. 
2008). 
 
The original working title of this thesis in 2006 was The Development impact of Fair Trade 
Coffee: How does Fair Trade Coffee Affect Producing Communities? 
As Fair Trade has changed after the time of the coffee crisis, and almost all of my existing 
reference material was focused on this period of time, it made sense to introduce a historical 
element, and thus to focus on the specific period of 1999-2004. The reason why this 
demarcation seems meaningful is that Fair Trade is and was viewed by its main governing 
body as a response to the failure of conventional trade (FLO: 2009). At the time of the crisis, 
conventional trade in coffee had hit rock bottom, and in many cases had failed to deliver 
sustainable livelihoods to producers (Osorio: 2004). Thus, the coffee crisis can be viewed as a 




difference in price between conventional coffee and Fair Trade was at the highest level ever, 
how could it ever deliver on these promises? Indeed, it seems plausible that some of the 
findings of the historical study of Fair Trade during the coffee crisis could be generalisable to 
contemporary Fair Trade coffee as well. 
 
The conducted research in this thesis is of a historical nature, with the demarcation lines 
being both temporal (1999-2004) as well as topical, being the impact of Fair Trade coffee - 
especially on producing communities - during the coffee crisis. The analysis is mostly 
qualitative, but some of the data, especially in the case studies, provide a quantitative basis 
for the findings. 
 
No one individual theoretical framework has been chosen to interpret all the data at hand, due 
to the fact that Fair Trade is such a multi-faceted phenomenon, and thus rallying around a 
certain theoretical focal point has seemed to be more of a hindrance than an advantage when 
trying to discern the complex interlinkages between the various phenomena extant in the Fair 
Trade network. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical framework of the global value chain (GVC) pioneered by e.g. 
Gereffi (Gereffi: 1994)  has functioned as a starting point for analysis, as it  functions as a 
tool for understanding how the various actors involved in Fair Trade coffee production and 
sales benefit (or don't!) from the Fair Trade system. 
 
2.1 Global value chains 
 
A global value chain (GVC) is a holistic view of the path of a product from the primary 
producers of natural resources all the way to the finished physical product in the marketplace 
(and even the disposal after use). Thus, value chain analysis includes all transformative stages 
in the process of creating a product, from design, transport, intermediate production stages, 
final production stages, packaging, to marketing and the final delivery of the product. 
(Kaplinsky: 2000) 
GVC analysis is mainly concerned with the vertical relationships between buyers and 
suppliers, i.e. the movement of a good or service from producer to consumer. The focus of 
GVC analysis lies on "flows of material resources, finance, knowledge and information 





The usefulness of the value chain framework when trying to analyse the difference between 
Fair Trade and conventional trade stems from the focus in value chain analyses on power 
relations. (Valkila et al.: 2010) Thus the various actors are not seen as operating in abstract, 
perfect, neutral markets, but market power and a certain 'drivenness' of a value chain is 
recognised, i.e. who has the upper hand in the relationships between buyers and suppliers, and 
how does this translate into the economical side of the transaction? 
Kaplinsky speaks of dynamic repositories of rent, in which rent - a kind of 'super profits' 
originating in various barriers to entry are captured by different parts of the value chain, 
depending on the entity that wields power (governs in Gereffi's terminology) in the value 




Gereffi (Gereffi: 1994) identifies two main types of governance structures in global value 
chains.4, the producer-driven and the buyer-driven. 
Producer-driven value chains are in general characterized by capital- and technology-
intensive industries, such as the automobile, aircraft or computer industries. 
Buyer-driven industries are characterised by being labor-intensive consumer goods, such as 
the garment, furniture or food industries. (Gereffi: 1994) Gereffi identifies the leaders or 
governing entities of buyer-driven industries as: 
 
...large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, and trading companies /.../ that frequently /.../ do not own any 
production facilities /.../ [and] that design and/or market, but do not make, the branded products they sell.  
(Gereffi: 1994, 97-99) 
 
Gereffi maintains that the reason why profits accumulate to the buyer in these value chains is 
the fact that they function as coordinating actors for a multitude of producers of low barriers 
to entry goods (foods, clothes, etc.) whose products are designed and marketed, by the buyer, 
for the international market. (Gereffi: 1994) 
 
 
4 Even though Gereffi (1994) uses the term Global Commodity Chain (GCC) in his analysis, this term has been 
replaced by the term Global Value Chain, to indicate that all value chains are not indeed centred around 




Various forms of buyers (retailers, branded marketers, industrial processors and international 
traders) function as the lead actors in different buyer-driven value chains. According to Ponte 
and Gibbon (2005) the level of control is usually higher in chains led by retailers, branded 
marketers and industrial processors (e.g. the coffee value chain) than in those led by 
international traders (e.g. the cotton value chain).  
Ponte and Gibbon (2005) build on the distinctions by Gereffi and present a new way of 
conceptualising value chains. Instead of a buyer- or producer-driven chain, their approach 
tries to identify a 'lead firm' that functions as the primus motor in a certain value chain, 
without it necessarily having to be a buyer or producer in the traditional sense. Thus, the 
possibility of a certain firm becoming lead firm depends on the informational, financial and 
technological characteristics of the value chain.                                                                                                                             
In the case of Fair Trade, the 'lead firm' can be said to be the certification system itself.  Thus 
the distinction between buyer-driven and producer-driven value chains loses some of its 
explanatory power as a new entity, the certification organization, takes on the driving role of 
the 'leading firm' in the FT value chain. (Valkila et al., 2010; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005) 
 
2.1.2 Governance in the coffee value chain 
 
International trading companies are the coordinators and the driving force in the coffee trade. 
According to Gibbon (2001), this is common among primary commodities that exhibit the 
characteristics of low value-to-weight ratios, globally dispersed production with seasonal 
discontinuities and a demand side segmented due to commodity variety (e.g. variations in 
types of coffee beans). International traders coordinate these GVCs through their consistency 
of supply, as they are able to give processors exactly the demanded volumes and quality 
mixes. Entry barriers to commodity trading are high levels of capital (due to large volumes), 
market knowledge, and intangibles such as reputation. As margins are low, volume needs to 
be high to procure profitability. Thus traders try to secure more than one source of production 
or and trade in more than one commodity if possible. The abovementioned characteristics of 
international commodity trading are the prime reason for the high level of power 






2.2. Research on Fair Trade 
 
Fair Trade has many facets. It is a phenomenon that has both staunch supporters (e.g. Rice: 
2001) and vociferous critics (e.g. Zehner: 2002). In my opinion the early study of the subject 
of Fair Trade suffered to some extent from a “goodwill” effect, i.e. as the phenomenon was 
perceived by many observers to induce positive change, thorough criticism (including 
adequate academic research) was lacking during the early days of the movement, i.e. the 
1990s and early 2000s. However, this seems to have changed during recent years and an 
increasing amount of critical research is being conducted on the subject. 
The increasing amount of research that Fair Trade has experienced can be explained to a large 
extent by its increasing importance. The general structure of the older articles was a brief 
definition of what Fair Trade is, followed by a historical overview of Fair Trade, concluded 
by a number of arguments for the beneficiality of Fair Trade - usually reflecting the stances of 
the Fair Trade organisations, without strong roots in empiry. Somewhat newer studies (Ruben 
ed., 2008; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010; Valkila et al., 2010) are supported by more extensive 
quantitative empirical research, and in the case of the studies in Ruben ed. (2008) and Valkila 
et al. (2010) control groups5 were chosen in the case studies of producer cooperatives to 
provide a counterfactual to the measured impacts of Fair Trade. 
 
 
3. What is Fair Trade? 
In this section Fair Trade is defined, and the Fair Trade system is scrutinized. 
 
3.1. Ethical trade and Fair Trade 
 
Fair Trade can be positioned within the larger field of Ethical Trade. Ethical trade can be 
defined as: 
  
...the adoption of societally and environmental[ly] responsible strategies within the value chain, the monitoring 
and verification of these strategies, and the reporting of societal and environmental performance to key 
stakeholders. (Blowfield and Jones: 1999, 2)      
 





Another definition is given by Heeks and Duncombe: 
 
Ethical trade can be defined as initiatives that seek to improve the social and environmental 
impacts of global supply chains. By definition, then, ethical trade can be seen as an 
attempted solution to a perceived problem of market failure. (Heeks and Duncombe: 2003, 2): 
 
The societal and environmental aspects that Blowfield and Jones (1999) mention, include 
such issues as human rights, worker welfare, producer livelihoods, sustainable production 
methods, animal welfare and biodiversity.  A varying number of issues are addressed in the 
different approaches towards ethical trading. Fair Trade is one approach; others are the in-
house codes of practice used by corporations, organic agriculture, environmental codes, forest 
and fisheries certification and the ethical trading initiative (ETI) of large western retailers and 
brand-owners. (Ponte, 2002; Blowfield and Jones, 1999; Tallontire, 2001a; Renard, 2001) 
Some observers argue that Ethical trading initiatives, including Fair Trade, try to supplement 
inadequate regulation by national governments, and instead rely on non-governmental 
regulation to rectify perceived deficiencies in the international trade regime. (Heeks and 
Duncombe, 2003; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010) 
This move away from the state as a hub or locus for structural change and instead gearing 
towards private initiatives - e.g. Fair Trade - was a general structural trend in many countries 
during the late 1990s and the 2000s. (Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) 
 
3.1.1. Challenging trading relations or producing ethically? 
 
In some of the early literature concerning Fair Trade (e.g. Tallontire: 2001a)   
ethical trade was divided into initiatives that seek to challenge trading relations (e.g. Fair 
Trade) and those that try to manage production in an ethical manner (sustainable fisheries, 
ethical sourcing initiatives). The view was that most ethical labels concentrate solely on the 
production process, e.g. the use of pesticides or workers' rights - such as freedom of 
association - concerning the production of the product in question. However, Fair Trade 
organisations were viewed to be interested in the power relations that emerge in trading 
relationships, and that they tried to enforce ethical behaviour along the entire value chain, 




This split between focusing on the production process or the whole value chain, has been a 
source of tension within the Fair Trade movement, and a case where the focus has oscillated 
depending on the scale and success of the FT products. (Valkila et al.: 2010) 
One of the benefits of ethical trading initiatives is that they tend to bring together a multitude 
of stakeholders, who had not previously taken part in the discussion on ethical practices in the 
various steps of the value chain. The argument that proponents of Fair Trade present, is that 
Fair Trade raises awareness among consumers and brings discussions about the structure of 
trading networks to the fore. Through media attention and the activities of many NGOs, the 
ethical questions surrounding trade are more strongly integrated into conventional business 
and trading procedures. These changes are a core part of measuring the "soft" non-economic 
impact that Fair Trade potentially has had, as a vehicle for societal - especially corporate - 
change towards more ethical and sustainable practices that in the end also can have a strong, 
however causally less linear, impact on communities of primary producers. (Blowfield, 1999; 
Heeks and Duncombe, 2003) 
 
3.2. Ethical standards and ethical labelling 
 
The certification of FT products follows a general model. The key concept is the standard - a 
set of principles, criteria and indicators representing good conduct. Moreover, a custodian of 
the standard is needed, auditors or monitors that verify that the standard is not compromised 
at any stage and finally an award for the producers (or a label to inform consumers) proving 
that they have achieved the criteria set by the custodian. 
Most ethical standards6 separate the role of custodian and certifier, and whereas FLO 
previously functioned as both the custodian and the monitor, this changed in 2004 as FLO 
separated its certifying arm from the main organisation and the former FLO Certification Unit 






As is the case with the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) or Social 




3.2.1. Fair Trade criteria and goals 
 
According to the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA), the goals of Fair Trade are as 
follows: 
1. To improve the livelihoods and well being of producers by improving market access, strengthening producer 
organisations, paying a better price and providing continuity in the trading relationship. 
2. To promote development opportunities for disadvantaged producers, especially women and indigenous 
people, and to protect children from exploitation in the production process. 
3. To raise awareness among consumers of the negative effects on producers of international trade so that they 
can exercise their purchasing power positively. 
4. To set an example of partnership in trade through dialogue, transparency and respect. 
5. To campaign for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade. 
6. To protect human rights by promoting social justice, sound environmental practice and economic security. 
(EFTA, 2001; Tallontire, 2001b) 
It is clear that these goals and criteria overlap to a certain extent, and as the Fair Trade 
movement matured, the stringency and rigour of the Fair Trade criteria increased. Further 
definitions and elaborations of the Fair Trade concept are given in the following section. 
Historically, the concept of Fair Trade has been used in at least two distinctive ways. 
On the one hand, "Fair Trade" was used in the debate concerning the merits of free trade and 
protectionism. In this discourse, the Fair Trade position equaled a call for protectionist 
measures by developed countries against cheap imports - perceived to harm domestic 
industries - produced in developing countries. (Moore, 2004; Maseland and de Vaal, 2002;  
Anderson and Riedl, 2004) 
On the one other, Fair Trade has been seen as "...a trading partnership, based on dialogue 
transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade."(Moore: 2004, 74)   
Nevertheless, due to the ascendancy of the Fair Trade movement, represented by e.g. FLO, 
the use of the words Fair Trade has become more and more synonymous with the latter use. 
This thesis deals exclusively with the second definition of Fair Trade. 
Even though Fair Trade usually is equated with the activities of the FLO, especially in 
northern Europe, other FT organisations exist, including another umbrella organisation, The 




(Traidcraft: 2020). Nevertheless, as FLO is the biggest player in the world FT market7, this 




The international governing body of Fair Trade, Fairtrade International or Fairtrade 
Labelling Organizations International e.V. (FLO) has a strong, albeit not a monopolous 
market position within the ethical market. Many retail chains and other multinational 
companies have launched competing “Fair Trade” or ethical brands. (Lyon and Moberg ed.: 
2010) FLO controls Fair Trade certification and is thus responsible for labelling the various 
types of Fair Trade products. 
FLO guarantees that any product sold with a Fair Trade label conforms to Fair Trade 
standards. Another task of FLO is business facilitation, i.e. communicating with producer 
organisations and traders to ensure the match of supply and demand. Furthermore, according 
to the FLO it actively tries to strengthen producer organisations and improve their production 
methods. (FLO: 2005a) Nevertheless, during the time of the coffee crisis FLO was repeatedly 
accused of being dominated by Northern members, and after a long period of criticism in 
FLO started including members from producer organisations and traders into the board of 
directors, previously dominated by representatives of National Labelling Initiatives, such as 
















7 The WFTO does not release any economic statements, thus one can only surmise - without complete certainty -  
that FLO is the biggest FT player as WFTO only presents the number of "livelihoods supported" (965,700 in 



























(from Reed et al.; 2012) 
 
In 2004, four representatives from producer organizations and two trader representatives were 
given seats at the Board of Directors, in addition to the six representatives from national 
labelling initiatives, the latter retaining the right to choose the Chair of the Board (see Figure 
3). Nevertheless, producers still argued that the new arrangements did not enable them to 
engage in decision-making and that the national labelling initiatives were still able to exercise 
control as a voting bloc, and did not even engage in real discussions according to producer 






3.3.1. Fair Trade criteria within the FLO 
 
At the time of the coffee crisis there were two types of requirements that Fair Trade producers 
had to fulfil. Minimum requirements, which all producer organisations had to meet must 
when they joined the Fair Trade network and progress requirements, that were ongoing 
requirements to improve. (FLO 2003a) For a detailed description of minimum and progress 
requirements for small farmers and hired labour, see Appendix 1: Generic Standards for Small 
Farmers' Organisations (FLO 2003a) and Appendix 2: Generic Fairtrade Standards for hired 
labour. (FLO: 2004)   
Fair Trade criteria have the same base but vary according to the diverging nature of the 
products and the markets that they are sold in, as well as according to the date when the 
criteria were written. For example, the criteria pertaining to Fair Trade coffee at the time of 
the coffee crisis only mentioned environmental sustainability briefly, whereas the banana 
criteria integrated crop management techniques as minimum entry criteria (Tallontire: 2001a). 
In 2001 draft standards for smallholders and waged labourers respectively were put forth for 
discussion. (Tallontire: 2001a) These standards were implemented during the coffee crisis and 
can be seen in the appendices. 
  
3.4. Fair Trade principles 
 
There are general principles that apply to both Fair Trade labelled goods and most goods 
under Alternative Trading Organisation (ATO) brand names. 
Perhaps the most important is the price premium, where the price of a Fair Trade product 
prices is guaranteed at a certain level. This level is either mutually agreed (ATO) or set in 
relation to world market prices (labelled goods). There is a Fair Trade premium for social and 
environmental investment and a bonus if the product is organically produced. In the case of 
coffee, credit advances of 60% of the value of the coffee harvest value are given upon 
request. (Raynolds: 2000) (Tallontire: 2001b) 
Fair Trade producer organisations are either democratically organised associations of small 
growers or plantations where workers are fully represented by independent democratic 
groups. Certification takes approximately 6 months, and is followed up by yearly audits by 
independent monitors overseen by FLO. (Raynolds: 2000)   
During the time of the coffee crisis the agro-ecological requirements of Fair Trade were less 




protect forests and wildlife habitat, prevention of erosion and water pollution, the reduction of 
chemical fertilisers and synthetic pesticide, and the composting of waste. The use of 
herbicides was forbidden in e.g. banana cultivation, but not in coffee production. (Raynolds: 
2000)  
Regarding labour rights, Fair Trade criteria follow ILO conventions, with the emphasis on 
rights to association and collective bargaining, freedom from discrimination and unequal pay, 
prohibition of forced or child labour, minimum social and labour conditions and the right to 
safe and healthy working conditions. (Raynolds: 2000) 
As an addendum one could highlight the fact, that after the crisis, almost all Fair Trade 
labeled coffee also became organic, thus creating the perception among many farmers  that 
Fair Trade was mostly about their product being "organic" as the Fair Trade aspect for many 
remained quite obscure. (Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) 
 
In the next section I turn to the workings of the international coffee market, as it is the 
benchmark against which one can compare the impact and success of Fair Trade coffee. 
 
4. The international coffee market 
 
This section begins by contextualizing international trade of which the coffee trade is part of. 
Then the focus will shift to coffee production, followed by an attempt to situate coffee in the 
wider context of the terms of trade for primary products and international commodity 
markets. The rise and fall of the of International Coffee Agreement will be discussed 
subsequently and finally attention will be given to the coffee value chain. 
 
4.1. Trade and globalisation 
 
The importance and pace of international trade has fluctuated during the last century, with 
periods of openness alternating with stints of protectionism.   
In the current phase of economic globalisation – beginning in the early 1980s and maintaining 
its rapid pace for more than three decades, with slight lulls during periods of economic 
downturn – global trade flows have consistently increased faster than economic output. 
During the second half of the 20th century, merchandise trade increased by a factor of twenty, 




On average, low income countries have become economically more globalised than high 
income countries.8 This increasing exposure to the global market has changed the economic 
fabric of many developing countries. (Dicken: 2011) 
 
4.1.1. Is trade beneficial? 
 
The debate on the benefits of trade has been continuous ever since classical economists such 
as Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued against mercantilist tendencies in the 18th century. 
The debate on the benefits of trade has had its ebb and flows. On the one hand some analysts 
have seen international trade as a cause of inequality and injustice, where the de-linking of a 
nation from the arena of international trade was viewed as the best solution for limiting the 
under-development and dependency caused by the first world. On the other hand, advocating 
increased trade and liberalisation of the economy has been the dominant mode of thinking in 
major development actors such as the World Bank and the IMF during large parts of the 
1980s and 1990s and perhaps to some extent into the present day. 
A part of the liberalization of the coffee trade was the collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement in 1989, as a number of countries (including the USA) withdrew from it. The ICA 
tried to maintain coffee prices within a pre-agreed price band, mainly through production 
quotas allocated to producing countries, and did so quite successfully for most of the time, 
except for times of severe frosts in Brazil (being the biggest coffee producer), when coffee 
shortages led to drastic price hikes. (Lewin et al.: 2004) 
The debate on the results of international trade have persisted into the twenty-first century, 
with the Fair Trade movement as one of the critical voices that question how international 
trade is conducted de facto. 
Even though free trade is viewed in neoclassical economic theory as something beneficial to 
all participating parties, other analysts have some caveats to this conclusion. According to 
Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), “even when trade liberalization leads to increased efficiency, it 
is a one-off effect.” In their view, the empirical evidence for increased trade liberalisation as 
something beneficial remains inconclusive and dependent on interpretation and the definition 
of economic openness. Moreover, they point out that even though countries could gain at an 
aggregate level, some populations within these countries could be worse off. As developing 
countries rarely are in possession of a comprehensive social safety net, the adjustment costs 
 




derived from increasing unemployment in previously protected industries can offset – or even 
exceed – potential trade gains. Many developing countries are socially unstable and have 
weak educational sectors, thus these newly unemployed people can become a drain on scarce 
societal resources, that would preferably be used elsewhere, and in the case of the 
liberalisation of agricultural markets, some of the most vulnerable groups have been affected, 
as small farmers have been undercut by international agribusiness. (Stiglitz and Charlton, 
2005; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010) 
 
4.1.2. Terms of Trade for primary products 
The potential decline of the terms of trade for countries that produce primary products has 
been a debated issue ever since the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis was presented in the late 
1940s. (Preston, 1996; Rist, 1997) 
Brown (1993) and Mshomba (2000) present a number of reasons for the unequal terms of 
trade between primary production and manufactured goods. 
Firstly, primary products are usually perishable and cannot be stored in the same way that 
manufactures can, thus increasing the potential for demand shocks. Secondly, many small 
European colonies were allocated the production of one or two primary products, like 
bananas and tobacco in Jamaica or iron and oil in Venezuela, leaving their economies 
vulnerable to price shocks due to the lack of diversification. Thirdly, bargaining power is 
distributed unevenly, as the multinational corporations that specialise in the trade and 
manufacture of primary products are relatively few,  counted in the thousands or even the 
hundreds, while there are virtually countless individuals participating in primary production - 
there being tens or even hundreds of millions of peasant households partaking in primary 
production. (Brown, 1993; Mshomba, 2000) 
The unwieldiness of many forms of primary production compounds this problem, as it takes 
more time to grow a coffee tree or open a new mine than it takes to adjust the output of an 
assembly line. Inadequate supply for a certain crop leads to rising prices and triggers a similar 
response from all farmers, i.e. a production increase, leading to a subsequent excess in supply 
that perpetuates the swings in commodity prices. Here the access to reliable market 
information is the key to a more stable price development. However, as many primary 
products are produced by small peasant households, the access to relevant information can be 
limited. 
The fact that small producers are vulnerable to supply and demand shocks and subsequent 




Coffee Producing Countries          Production Share      % growth since 1989 
(in thousands of 60-kg bags, 2004)      (globally)      
 
Brazil 38,264     34%               +56% 
 
Vietnam 14,000     12%                +1292%  (!) 
 
Colombia 10,500    9%                -19% 
 
Indonesia 5,750     5%                -16% 
 
Ethiopia 5,000     4%                +45% 
 
India 4,850     4%                +172% 
 
Mexico 4,500     4%                 -11% 
 
Guatemala 3,450     3%                   -1% 
 
Peru 3,067     3%                 +98% 
 
Honduras 2,750     2%                +56% 
 
Other 20,542     18%                -35% 
 




following example. In 1989 coffee prices had to fall by over twenty per cent before Nestlé 
reduced its soluble coffee price by ten per cent. However, when the coffee price plummeted, 
the buying price that Nestlé offered its coffee producers was lowered immediately. (Brown, 
1993; Anderson and Riedl, 2004) 
According to OXFAM, the increased production volumes of coffee prior to the crisis can be 
seen to some extent as the result of an intentional strategy presented to developing countries 
by the World Bank and other organisations. World Bank loans were vital in facilitating the 
Vietnamese coffee boom and in Colombia and Bolivia farmers were encouraged to switch 
from coca cultivation to coffee by UN-sponsored programmes. (OXFAM: 2001 quoted in 
Nigh: 2002, 2)    
4.2. Coffee production and sales. 


























(from Calo and Wise: 2005) 
 
At the end of the 1990s coffee was produced in more than 50 countries, and some 25 million 
small farmers were dependent on coffee for their livelihood.9 During this time, of all 
commodities, the value of coffee traded worldwide was second only to petroleum. (Mutua: 
2000) 
In the early 1990s export earnings by coffee producing countries were some US$10-12 billion 
and the value of global retail sales of coffee about US$30 billion. Towards the end of the 
coffee crisis the value of retail sales exceeded US$70 billion but coffee producing countries 
only received some US$5.5 billion (Osorio: 2004), thus clearly indicating that rents from the 
value chain were captured downstream (near the selling point) rather than upstream.          
 
The coffee market is characterised by periods of shortages and gluts, causing the market to be 
volatile, as small farmers, who seldom have deep insights into the future of the coffee market, 
react to rising prices by planting trees. Thus, the changes in supply only come into effect a 
couple of years later, which leads to market volatility. (Lindsey: 2004) A downward 
movement of supply is neither very likely as the fixed costs of coffee farming (planting and 
maintaining the trees) are high in relation to total costs. 
World coffee production was usually surpassing consumption during the late 1990s and the 
beginning of the early 2000s, creating large stocks of unsold coffee (see table 2). The sharp 
rise in coffee production was mainly due to two factors, the ascendancy of the low-cost 
producers Brazil and Vietnam, with Vietnam's production rising from 1.4 million bags in 
1990 to 12.3 million in 2001 (see table 1). In the 1990s Brazil's coffee production ranged 
from 25 to 35 million bags, but in 2002 production rose to almost 50 million. In the wake of 
these production increases, there was a steady increase of coffee-related jobs in Vietnam - 
from 300,000 in the early 1990s ago to 4-5 million some ten years later. At the same time, 
there was a concurrent decrease in the Central American coffee sector of an estimated 
200,000 permanent and 400,000 seasonal jobs. (Lindsey: 2004) 
 
9
 Milford presents another figure, including not only the farmers but also their dependants. Thus, according to 
her, around 125 million people worldwide depended on coffee for their livelihood towards the end of the coffee 





However due to poor weather in Brazil, the 2003/04 crop was smaller than in many years, 
leading to a sharp decline in world coffee production and concomitant rising coffee prices, 
thus marking the beginning of end of the coffee crisis.10, 
. Table 2. World Coffee Production and Consumption 2001-2004. 
World Coffee Production and Consumption (million bags green coffee) 
                                               2001/02        2002/03       2003/04       
  World coffee production       111.6             124.3           108.5          
World coffee consumption    114.2             118.0            115.5         
Stocks of coffee                      22.9                 20.3             27.6 
Difference                              -2.6                  +6.3             -7.0              
One bag = 60 kg or 132 pounds (from Lindsey: 2004) 
4.3. Commodity Control Schemes   
 
To stabilize markets and maintain price levels, commodity control schemes were in place 
between the two World Wars. The central measures were: a restriction of output combined 
with a stockpiling of surplus goods. During the 1920s, schemes supported by national 
governments were introduced for copper, tin, rubber, coffee, wheat, sugar and cotton. 
Governments had experience in market regulation because of the First World War and the 
planned production that it required. Nevertheless, all the schemes of the 1920s failed, as high 
prices attracted new producers to the market or encouraged the development of substitutes. 
Notwithstanding the failures of the control schemes of the 1920s, new schemes were 
introduced following the even bigger price collapse of the 1930s. In the USA, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 was a precursor to the subsidy systems prevalent in the OECD of 
today, paying growers to plough in their crops and guaranteeing their prices. 
The commodity agreements of the 1930s relied on a central body with enough power to 
maintain credible limits of production for a certain commodity, such as the British 
government with its vast imperial territories. It is plausible to maintain that many of the 
agreements would have failed, if not for the oncoming World War and the resources needed to 
wage it. (Brown: 1993) 
After the war, the Bretton Woods institutions were set up, with J.M. Keynes as one main 
architect in the role of chief British delegate. According to Keynes, commodity agreements 
should not be based on restricted production, but rather on the use of buffer stocks that would 
 




grow during overproduction and diminish during shortages. Keynes’ assumption was that 
short-term fluctuations of supply and demand were the main causes behind price fluctuations, 
something that would be remedied by buffer stocks. In cases of persistent disequilibria, other 
measures were to be taken, such as aiding development and diversification of production. 
During the post-war period, up until 1951, commodity prices grew due to US economic 
growth and stockpiling for the Korean War. In 1952 after the Korean War had ended, many 
commodities, such as jute, rubber and sisal fell to half of their peak price levels. In the 1950s 
and early 1960s a number of commodity agreements were made, including agreements for 
wheat, sugar, tin, coffee, etc. (Brown: 1993) 
 
 
4.3.1. Decommodifying coffee 
 
A commodity is a product or factor prone to low barriers to entry, subject to intense 
competition and thus to declining terms of trade. Commodities are of uniform quality and 
value, and are interchangeable. Most agricultural products are commodities, such as wheat, 
whereas some agricultural products have been "decommodified" - e.g. wine, specialty 
coffees, etc. - due to branding and differentiation through taste, place of origin, etc. (Fitter and 
Kaplinsky: 2001)   
Since the demise of the economic provisions of the International Coffee Agreement, the share 
of the producers of the final retail price fell sharply in the mid and late 1990s (Talbot: 1997). 
One way of escaping the commoditization that pesters the coffee market is to create entry 
barriers, by setting up producer or buyer cartels or by upgrading. Upgrading in the context of 
the coffee market, would consist of the branding and differentiation process described above. 
This process led to the birth of a rapidly expanding specialty coffee industry, with a retail 
value of $7.8 billion in 2001. In the early 2000s the specialty coffee market represented 
almost 20% of US coffee imports by volume and 40% of the retail market by value. (Bacon, 
2005; Lindsey, 2004) 
Upgrading into specialty coffee, as a remedy for low producer prices, has been on the agenda 
for many analysts of the coffee market (Zehner, 2002; Ponte, 2003; Lindsey, 2004); the 




Jamaican Blue Mountain11 coffee rather than a bulk pack of generic coffee? And is this 
specialisation possible or even desirable for all food products, or would it remain as a 
privilege for an exclusive minority like coffee and wine? Another topic of interest is the 
consumption behaviour of people purchasing specialty food products, i.e. would it be a zero-
sum game where some products - and their producers - would gain, whereas others would 
lose a similar amount? 
 
4.4. The International Coffee Agreement 
 
The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was pre-dated by a 1958 Producers’ Agreement 
among Latin American countries on export quotas, following a collapse of coffee prices. The 
reason for falling coffee prices was a huge increase in the planting of coffee trees in Brazil, 
Central America and East Africa, stimulated by the high prices of the 1950s. (Brown, 1993; 
Mshomba, 2000)  
In 1962 an international agreement was signed with the participation of all the major 
producers and consumers. The aim was to maintain the 1962 price level by regulating exports 
through quotas. Frost and drought initially raised prices over the 1962 level, and even though 
prices subsequently evened out after increased supply, they did not drop below the 1962 
target levels. In 1968 a diversification fund was set up to help with structural changes aiming 
to prevent the over-planting of coffee. (Brown. 1993) 
In 1973 there was a crisis in the negotiations, as it seemed that importing countries would 
withdraw from the agreement, due to the producers demanding higher prices and reduced 
quotas. (Mshomba: 2000)  
Prices remained high in the coffee market, due to frosts (1975) and droughts (1986) in Brazil. 
However, when the negotiations for a new coffee agreement began in 1988 there were 
significant disagreements among members. The main points of disagreement were the 
allocation of export quotas, the inflexibility of the quota system that hindered importing 
countries from obtaining the desired amount of the types of coffee that they wanted 
 
11 Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee is one of the most expensive and sought-after coffees in the world, 







(especially high quality mild arabicas), and the two-tier market system in which exports to 
non-member countries were sold at lower prices than exports to members, inviting 
malpractice and even smuggling of coffee. In July 1989 the economic provisions of the ICA 
were suspended, and within a few days the price of coffee had fallen by more than 25 % due 
to heavy selling by exporters. The last ICA was reached in 1994, without the participation of 
the United States and without any economic provisions. (Mshomba: 2000) (Calo and Wise: 
2005) 
 
4.5. The coffee value chain 
 
The coffee commodity chain is a complex entity containing many links. A coffee bean can 
change hands up to 150 times before it reaches the consumer. Primary producers sell 
unprocessed coffee to private intermediaries, who transport the coffee to a processing plant. 
After the coffee is processed, it is sold by a local exporter to an international trader. Roasting 
companies purchase coffee from the traders, and sell it on to retailers. The retailers, i.e. 
supermarkets, cafés, etc. are the final stop for the coffee until it is bought by consumers. 
(Milford: 2004) 
In the conventional coffee market, roasters have maintained a dominant position through the 
effective use of asymmetry of information on quality. Essentially, roasters buy coffee from 
international traders with complete information on quality. Once coffee is blended and 
roasted, it is sold to consumers under a brand name. The important point here is that roasters 
have complete information on quality when they buy coffee, and they release next to no 
information to their clients (retailers, wholesalers). For example, in the conventional coffee 
value chain, ‘relational’ contracting between roasters and importers, and between importers 
and exporters, usually takes place in an environment of fairly accurate information on coffee 
quality (industrial convention). In producing countries, on the contrary, most transactions take 
place with only limited information on quality communicated. (Ponte and Gibbon: 2005) 
 



















(from Valkila et al.: 2010, modified by the author) 
 
Valkila et al. present a view of the Fair Trade Coffee value chain as having metamorphosed 
from its origins, when the value chain was short, and middlemen were cut, to being more or 
less on par with the conventional coffee chain (see figure 4). 
Thus figure 4 presents the original idea of Fair Trade coffee (the broad dark line), in which 
small producers sold their FT coffee to cooperatives, who in turn sold their coffee to Fair 
Trade roasters, with specialized World Shops being the last stop before reaching consumers.  
Figure 4 also includes the routes of conventional and Fair Trade coffee (the arrows) after the 
ascent of Fair Trade labelling practices (through e.g. the FLO), that were in place during the 
coffee crisis (and also today). The routes of both FT and conventional coffee are more or less 
identical, with the exception of the primary producer, i.e. that only small farmers are eligible 
to join the FT system. (Valkila et al.: 2010) 
 
4.5.2. The role of middlemen in the (Fair Trade) value chain 
 
At the local level, the coffee chain has been dominated by local middlemen, or as they are 
called in many parts of Latin America: coyotes. (Ruben ed.: 2008) 
One view on the role of middlemen is presented by Zehner (2002) who argues that growers 




Zehner argues that when the markets for intermediaries fail, a few or perhaps even one 
middleman can capture large segments of the market, leading to a situation of monopsony. 
Zehner concludes that the coffee market exhibits characteristics such as high search costs (for 
buyers to find sellers, and vice versa), difficulty in assessing product quality, high costs for 
sellers to obtain information about market prices and limited reputational spillovers for 
producers of poor-quality output (leading to moral hazard). According to the literature on 
intermediaries that Zehner refers to, all the abovementioned characteristics are instances in 
which the existence of a middleman increases welfare. (Zehner: 2002)   
Aside from theory, what is the empirical foundation for these claims? According to Mendoza 
(2000) middlemen do indeed reduce search costs for buyers, thus increasing efficiency.  
However, when assessing product quality, middlemen often cheat growers by claiming that 
their beans are more humid (a negative quality) than they actually are. This behaviour is not 
limited to the middlemen, as growers retaliate by lying about the geographical origin of the 
crop or by adding dirt or stones into the coffee bag. Furthermore, middlemen often lie to 
growers about prices in downstream markets, thus creating a situation of suboptimal 
performance arising from mutual distrust. (Zehner: 2002) 
Valkila12 (2006, personal communication) has a contrary view to Zehner, at least regarding 
the Nicaraguan situation. He maintains that in the coffee transactions he observed, both 
buyers and sellers were very knowledgeable regarding the quality of the coffee that was sold. 
Moreover, the quality of the coffee was always checked and was easily agreed on by both 
parties. 
Returning to Zehner's (2002) argument; what are the desired results of Fair Trade in the 
context of middlemen and search costs? In the case of search costs, the hoped for effect of 
Fair Trade is quite evident. In the ideal case, Fair Trade buyers develop long-term 
relationships with supplier cooperatives, thus eliminating search costs. However, Zehner 
claims that the costs of intermediation are higher than in normal supply chains and that Fair 
Trade buyers are not as knowledgeable about the market as the traditional middlemen are. 
When one looks at the difficulties associated with assessing product quality, the idea is that 
the integrity of Fair Trade buyers will ensure a “virtuous circle” in which buyers will pay a 
higher price and growers will supply coffee of higher quality. According to Zehner (2002), 
 
12 At the time of the communication, in 2006, Joni Valkila was a researcher at  the Helsinki University 
Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences and was writing his doctoral thesis on the subject of Fair 





growers actually sell poor-quality coffee to Fair Trade buyers, who are less able to distinguish 
quality coffee and are perceived as less demanding regarding quality. 
There is some controversy regarding this issue, which became apparent in a comment on 
Zehner’s paper made by Paul Rice, President and CEO of TransFair USA. (Rice: 2002)  
In his paper, Rice maintained that Fair Trade coffee is sold by "the most discerning specialty 
coffee companies in the U.S. market /.../ [that] have built their competitive success vis-à-vis 
Folgers and Maxwell House by never compromising on quality and accepting only the 
highest quality beans from any source, including Fair Trade farmers." (Rice: 2002, 3) 
Moreover, Fair Trade coffees have won top honours in many quality competitions such as the 
Cup of Excellence award. According to Rice, farmers are presented with a strong incentive to 
sell their best coffee beans to the Fair Trade market, knowing that if they want to sell more 
coffee at Fair Trade prices, they must adhere to the industry’s demand for consistently high 
quality. (Rice: 2002) 
Valkila (2006, personal communication) supports the viewpoint of Rice, claiming that: "In 
Nicaragua Fair Trade cooperatives are more demanding on quality than any other coffee 
buyers."  
 
According to Zehner (2002), there is a clear gap between the access to market prices in the 
conventional coffee trade and the Fair Trade system. As the Fair Trade movement commits to 
a publicly known floor price, the opportunity for individual buyers to cheat or mislead is 
reduced drastically. Zehner claims, however, that new middlemen arise - claiming to represent 
producer groups or cooperatives - and that monopsony and mutual distrust are still part and 
parcel of the Fair Trade system. (Zehner: 2002) 
According to Zehner, theory predicts that competitive markets among intermediaries and 
growers should prevent cheating by either party. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, mutual 
deceit can exist. Zehner identifies the reason as being the existence of concentrated, non-
competitive intermediary markets at several points in the supply chain. In the case of the 
coffee chain, these types of markets can be identified at least among roasters and international 
trading companies as well as among exporters. (Zehner: 2002) 
According to Zehner, Fair Trade does not correct the power imbalances in the traditional 
supply chain. He quotes Mendoza, who presents a new actor on the trading stage, namely the 
“new middleman”, who represents cooperatives or groups of cooperatives in negotiations 
with Fair Trade buyers. The description by Mendoza (2000) of these new middlemen, is 





They have more access to various resources, exercise their role in a despotic, authoritarian manner (For example 
they constantly change the rules of the game; they use credit to get hold of the coffee; they expel members who 
deal with other enterprises), they hide information, deceive the cooperatives with false promises, and legitimize 
themselves through their contacts with international organizations (buyers, banks, unions, the government and 
NGOs). All this allows directors to act without any accountability to the formal owners of the enterprise: the 
first-level cooperatives and producers.  (Mendoza: 2000) 
 
Again Rice’s rebuttal is clear. He attacks Zehner’s argument on the grounds of inadequate 
empirical evidence, referring to Zehner’s use of only a single source (Mendoza: 2000). Rice 
claims that Mendoza’s article is fundamentally flawed, as it makes generalizations about “the 
internal functioning of cooperatives without providing any supporting data or evidence 
whatsoever.” (Rice, 2002, 2) 
 
The criticism that Rice directs against Zehner is in my opinion an expression of a prevalent 
tendency in the literature concerning Fair Trade at the time of the coffee crisis. As the 
literature was dispersed and usually overlapping, often repeating the findings of the same 
scholars in new wrappings, rigorous empirical evidence regarding Fair Trade was not 
abundant at the time, and even less theoretical reflection on the different aspects of the subject 
was available. This led to a situation where the debate on the subject seemed to be based more 
on one's pre-judgements and prejudices than rigorous theoretical analysis or empirical 
findings. However, this situation has mostly been remedied, as more insightful studies have 
been published on the subject such as Lyon and Moberg ed. (2010) Ruben ed., (2008) and 
Valkila et al. (2010) 
 
 
4.5.2. Governance and control along the value chain 
 
In 1998, at the doorstep of the coffee crisis, the two largest international traders Neusmann 
and Volcafé (see figure 4, page 33) controlled 29 % of the international coffee trade whereas 
the six largest companies controlled more than 50 %, thus creating a oligopsony and 
oligopoly situation at the trader level (with accompanying market power). (Milford, 2004; 
Ponte, 2002a) 
The market for roasting was even more concentrated than that of the traders, as Nestlé and 
Philip Morris controlled 49 % of the world market for roasted and instant coffee. (Mendoza 




Thus, the downstream concentration in the coffee chain during the coffee crisis allowed a few 
large international players to control the market, making coffee “a buyers’ market at each 
linkage”. (Milford: 2004, 6) 
After the demise of the economic provisions included in the International Coffee Agreement 
in 1989, the price of coffee in international commodity markets was very volatile. As the 
market was liberalised, there was little control over production volumes, something that 
caused strong growth of production and consequent periodic oversupply. 
Furthermore, the nature of the coffee market was changing at the turn of the century, as a 
result of the "latte revolution". Due to the rapid increase of coffee shops, the coffee product 
became more intangible, and increasingly such factors as the ambience and lifestyle, became 
a main attraction for coffee drinkers. (Ponte: 2002a) 
In the wake of these changes, both producing countries and the producers themselves 
experienced plummeting shares of total revenues. In the 1970s producers earned more than 
20% of total revenues, while the figure rose as high as 27.6 per cent during the coffee boom 
of the late 1970s. In the 1990s the share had fallen to approximately 15 to 20 per cent, 
whereas it declined during the coffee crisis at the turn of the century to below 10 per cent, 
even though the retail market more than doubled during the 1992-2002 period. (Mendoza and 
Bastiansen, 2003; Milford, 2004; Calo and Wise, 2005)  
This decline in revenue reflected on employment as well. A 2002 World Bank report (cited in 
Murray et al. 2003) estimated that the slump in coffee prices caused a 54 percent decline in 
permanent employment and a 21 percent decline in seasonal employment in the Central 
American coffee sector.  
One vivid example of the circumstances affecting coffee growers at the turn of the century, is 
given by Renard who claims that the growers of Arabica coffee in Mexico and Central 
America received a price around 50 cents a pound, while production costs in Mexico were 
around 90 cents a pound. (Renard: 2003, 92) 
  
4.5.3. Coffee processing and exporting 
 
Coffee processing is a complicated and expensive process that is beyond the scope of most 
small farmers. The processor needs expertise in transport, storage, safekeeping, marketing as 
well as the requisite finance to insure the coffee. The processing of coffee means that the thin 
shell of the bean is removed as well as any remaining debris (mostly sticks and stones), 




coffee beans with regards to quality and size. In addition, the separated coffee is fermented in 
tanks to enrich the flavour. The green coffee is then packed into bags and moved to ports for 
export or transferred to a coffee roaster.  It is difficult for an unknown exporter to gain entry 
to the international market. International traders and roasters have strict quality standards and 
they are unwilling to risk a potential default on a coffee shipment by the exporter. (Milford: 
2004).   
 
4.5.4. Fluctuations in the coffee price 
 
It takes three to four years from the planting of a coffee tree until one can start harvesting 
berries from it. A coffee tree reaches its peak capacity around its fifth or sixth year. The 
production of high quality beans can be maintained after that for around twenty years, 
followed by another twenty years of declining yields. Because of these underlying factors, the 
supply of coffee is relatively unresponsive to rapid changes in price, i.e. coffee has a low 
supply elasticity. (Milford: 2004)  
The price elasticity of demand is also low, as coffee demand drops only when coffee prices 
rise significantly (most people are used to their morning cup of coffee!). (Arnot et al.: 2006) 
As both supply and demand are relatively unresponsive to price changes, prices on the world 
market fluctuate significantly. A common scenario that leads to rapid swings in the price of 
coffee is the occurrence of unexpected frosts or diseases that leads to a supply shortage. These 
supply shortages lead to increasing coffee prices without a dent in the demand for coffee. 
Producers then react to the high prices by increasing supply, i.e. planting new trees that 
mature after three to four years, when the market possibly has a very different outlook than it 
had when the planting took place. The interaction of these factors creates a highly volatile 
market for coffee. (Milford: 2004) 
 
4.5.5.  Rent-capturing and informational disparities along the value chain 
 
One existing problem within the coffee value chain is the lack of a clear relation between 
export price and the remuneration that growers receive for their products. This state of affairs 
sends faulty signals to growers, thus leading to perverse incentives. 
One such perverse incentive is the lack of incentive to improve quality. If quality and price 




The tenuous link between export prices and grower prices are exemplified by the Venezuelan 
situation during the coffee crisis. 
 In September 1999, the average export price for Venezuelan coffee was $1.35 per pound. Of 
this sum total around nine tenths was captured by processing, transports and taxes, whereas 
growers received only around one tenth. In Guatemala the average export price was $ 0.83 
per pound, still Guatemalan growers received approximately four times more per pound than 
their Venezuelan counterparts (two thirds of the export price) (Zehner: 2002) 
 
4.5.6. Improving the coffee value chain 
 
Zehner (2002) identifies two possible interventions that could alter the inefficient functioning 
of the coffee supply chain. According to Zehner, the flaws in the coffee chain that prevent the 
achievement of an optimum level are mainly informational. Thus, he suggests that an 
improvement in the ability of middlemen to discern coffee quality is vital, something that can 
be achieved either through training or the introduction of equipment.  
 Another possibility in rectifying the imbalances along the supply chain would be to re-
establish the link between grower prices and export prices that was severed by liberalization. 
If information regarding the export prices of coffee would be more readily available to 
growers, they would presumably be able to demand better prices for high-quality coffee, thus 
creating an incentive to improve coffee quality. Nevertheless, Zehner presents a caveat to the 
aforementioned argument that an improvement of quality would be a solution for the 
imperfect coffee supply chain, namely that because many agricultural supply chains are 
characterised by low barriers to entry and mature technologies, there is a strong price pressure 
even for high-quality producers. The solution to this dilemma could be the adoption of a 
marketing system similar to that prevalent in the wine industry, branding coffee by region or 
even by estate. This kind of product differentiation has the creation of barriers to entry as its 
goal, something that presumably would strengthen the position of growers and help them to 
receive premium prices for their products. (Zehner: 2002) 
Brand development might seem like an attractive solution, as according to Zehner, “it focuses 
on addressing power imbalances between producing countries and consuming countries rather 
than just those imbalances within the producing countries.”(Zehner: 2002, 21) 
 The introduction of highly branded, high premium commanding coffees in a supply chain 
characterised by distrust, inefficiency and information gaps is a difficult task. Zehner 




clearly a price for each grower at which coffee production becomes uneconomical.” (Zehner: 
2002, 21) 
 As the production decisions of growers are usually based on interactions in a very narrow 
social network, there are strong limitations on the economic efficiency of the decisions. Thus 
one effective way of aiding growers according to Zehner, given an oversupply in world 
markets, is to assist them in switching to other more competitive crops or other forms of 
income. (Zehner: 2002) 
 
 
5. Production and sales of Fair Trade coffee during the 
coffee crisis
 
5.1. Fair Trade production 
Fair Trade labelling organisations are not directly involved in commodity production or trade. 
Instead, during the coffee crisis, they tried to promote the market for Fair Trade products by 
working with coffee importers, roasters/wholesalers, and retailers. Coffee distributors could 
buy a licence to display the logo of a Fair Trade labelling organisation such as Trans Fair, 
MaxHavelaar or Fair Trade Mark. They could use these different types of Fair Trade logos if 
they bought their coffee from grower organisations registered and approved by FLO 
(Raynolds: 2002) 
Coffee importers using Fair Trade standards had to uphold the following standards: 
 
(1) Purchases must be made directly from grower organizations using purchasing agreements that extend beyond 
one harvest cycle. (2) Importers must guarantee the FLO minimum price (US$ 1.21 per pound for Arabica 
coffee) and pay a social premium (US$ .05 per pound) above that minimum or above the world market price 
(whichever is higher). Certified organic coffee must get a further premium (US$ .15 per pound). (3) Importers 
must offer pre-financing equal to 60 percent of the contract value upon request. (Raynolds: 2002, 6) 
 
The following regulations applied to Fair Trade coffee producers: 
(1) Producers must be small family based growers. (2) Producers must be organized into politically independent 
democratic associations. (3) Producers must pursue ecological goals conserving natural resources and limiting 
chemical input use. (Raynolds: 2002, 6) 





Coffee formed the core of Fair Trade initiatives in Europe and North America. In most 
countries Fair Trade and organic consumption grew in tandem and in the early 2000s 
approximately 40 percent of the world’s Fair Trade coffee was also certified organic. 
(Raynolds: 2002) 
At the time of the coffee crisis, FLO had registered more than 300 coffee grower associations 
representing approximately 500,000 small-scale growers in Latin America, Africa and Asia or 
approximately 30 percent of the world's small-scale coffee growers, many of who belonged to 
indigenous communities. (Murray et al., 2003; Rice, 2001)  
The co-operatives producing Fair Trade coffee ranged from the large and strictly organised - 
some East African coffee co-operatives had more than 50,000 members - to the small and 
informal.  (Rice: 2001) 
While Fair Trade certification agencies suggested a total production capacity of 165 million 
pounds of Fair Trade coffee across the globe, actual import volume of Fair Trade certified 
green coffee for 2003 was only 61.3 million pounds. Thus, there was a clear discrepancy 
between supply and demand, leading to a situation where many cooperatives producing FT 
coffee had to sell most of their produce on the conventional market. (Calo and Wise: 2005) 
It can be argued, that the process of choosing the producers for Fair Trade during the coffee 
crisis did not follow the spirit of the programme to the fullest. The producers of Fair Trade 
goods were rarely the poorest and most vulnerable in the societies where they lived, and in 
many cases the participation of a group of producers in the Fair Trade system was more the 
sum of many fortunate incidents than a part of a master plan. (Tallontire: 2001a) 
 
During the coffee crisis Fair Trade presented an alternative approach to the production 
of coffee, as a common trend in the late 1990s and early 2000s in conventional commercial 
coffee production was the modernization and technification of production. The interests in 
control of conventional coffee production viewed the increase of yields and profits as central, 
whereas issues like equity and environmental sustainability were put in the background.  
(Rice: 2001) This focus on increasing yields can be seen as an exacerbating factor in the 







5.2. Fair Trade sales at the time of the crisis 
 
At the turn of the millenium a number of different labelling initiatives brought the Fair Trade 
label to the conventional retail market, including Max Havelaar - at the time active in 7 
European countries - TransFair (4 countries), Fairtrade Mark (United Kingdom and Ireland), 
Reilun kaupan edistämisyhdistys (Finland) and Rättvisemärkt (Sweden). The retail value of 
these labelled (food) products sold in Europe, was approximately 210 million € in 2001. 
(EFTA: 2001) 
In 2003, Fair Trade products were sold in 19 European countries, in the US, Canada Mexico, 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand and in 2004 FLO estimated a total retail value of its 
products being 830 million € with sales growing by 49%, when compared to 2003. (FLO: 
2005a)  
To put these numbers into perspective, in 2018 total Fair Trade sales were almost 10 billion 
USD annually (FLO: 2019), and at the time of the crisis, global retail coffee sales amounted 
to some 70 billion USD. (Osorio: 2004) 
The main problem with trying to find suitable quantitative data on Fair Trade sales is the fact 
that FLO does not publish the (disaggregated) monetary value of the various products sold. 
Instead it reports the physical volume. Data from FLO (cited in Raynolds: 2002) shows that 
Fair Trade coffee sales grew from 11,370 tons in 1997 to 19,830 tons in 2003. To put these 
numbers into context, one can look at bananas, being the product with the largest sales by 
volume towards the end of the coffee crisis, amounting to some 80,000 tonnes with coffee as 
the second, with 24,000 tonnes sold in 2004. (FLO, 2005a; NRET, 1999) 
At the turn of the century, the average penetration of Fair Trade coffee - in the countries 
where it was sold - was approximately 1.4%. Fair Trade coffee held an average of 1.2 percent 
of European national markets and had captured roughly three percent of the market in 
Luxemburg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. (Rice, 2001; Raynolds, 2002) 
 
 
6. Fair Trade Organisations 
 
Even though the structure of the Fair Trade system has been alluded to in section 3, when 




clearer understanding of the Fair Trade edifice. The focus in this section will be on the most 
relevant organisation for producers, namely the cooperative. 
 
There is a plethora of different types of Fair Trade organisations assuming different roles 
along the value chain, starting from the producers in the South to the consumers in the North. 
The central actors in Fair Trade are on the one hand local producers, producer organisations 
and local marketing organisations; on the other, overseas labelling organisations and buyers. 
(NRET: 1999) 
 
6.1. Producer Organisations 
 
Producer organisations are, as the name implies, the producers and exporters of Fair Trade 
products. The producer organisations vary in size and structure, from loose family 
organisations to large co-operatives. For many Fair Trade products (e.g. coffee) at the time of 
the coffee crisis, the co-operative was the only allowed form of organisation. (EFTA: 2001) 
(Mellor and Moore: 2005) 
Some observers had a very positive view on FT producer organisations at the time of the 
coffee crisis (Raynolds: 2002), seeing them as vehicles for political change or some form of 
social movement, whereas others saw them as functioning in similar manners to actors in 
conventional market channels. (Renard: 2000) (Renard: 2001) 
This first "idyllic" view, is exemplified by Whatmore and Thorne (quoted in Raynolds: 2002, 
13) who maintain that Fair Trade networks of producers and consumers are characterised by 
connectivity rather than competition, through multi-directional exchanges of discursive and 
material resources. 
Moreover, Raynolds (2002) presents the hypothesis that coffee growers that share a strong 
ideological commitment to ecological or social justice values, are more likely to succeed in 
alternative coffee production and trade than those organisations whose values are more 
individualistic, competitive and geared towards environmental exploitation. 
 
Renard (quoted in Raynolds: 2002, 13) presents a different view of the nature of Fair Trade 
networks. In her view labelling organisations see their activities as a new form of relation 
between producers and consumers, however, producer groups and their members see these 




Tallontire (quoted in Raynolds: 2002, 13) maintains that Alternative Trade Organisations and 
many producer groups have fundamentally different views of their partnership. The ATOs 
view this partnership as a vehicle for development, whereas the producer groups are mostly 
concerned with the market opportunities that the relationship provides.  
This second view, of FT producer groups as functioning more or less like conventional 
producers, without further political or social agendas is corroborated by other observers, such 
as Lyon and Moberg (2010) and Ruben (2008).   
 
Further support for this second view, is the finding by Murray et al. (2003) that during the 
coffee crisis, there were many complaints by producer organisations about FLO inspections 
and inspectors, of instances when insufficient feedback was given, and where inspectors were 




Co-operatives are key actors in the system of Fair Trade coffee. They are umbrella 
organisations for thousands of small-scale farmers participating in the production of Fair 
Trade coffee. Even though co-operatives are the only form of organisation allowed for Fair 
Trade producer groups working with coffee, the links that exist between Fair Trade labelling 
organisations and especially the rank and file of the co-operatives, are often tenuous. (Rice, 
2001; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010; Ruben ed., 2008)  
This tenuous link is exemplified by interviews of co-operative members made by Milford 
(2004), through which she concludes that many members had troubles even understanding the 
Fair Trade system. Also, the knowledge about Fair Trade criteria was lacking, with most 
respondents referring to technical issues such as avoiding chemical pesticides or not burning 
the vegetation instead of the social and economic provisions that are at the heart of Fair 
Trade. (Milford, 2004; Nigh, 2002; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010; Ruben ed., 2008) In the case 
studies conducted by Ruben (2008), many FT producers were not even aware that they were 
producing for the FT system, rather connotating various production criteria, certification and 






6.2.1. Co-operatives in theory and practice 
 
Coffee purchasing co-operatives are democratic organisations owned and run by members. 
The members are individually in charge of their coffee production, leaving the role of the co-
operative to the fields of marketing and processing. The surplus gained by the co-operative is 
retained by its members.   
There is some dissent regarding the effectiveness of co-operatives in providing for the needs 
of small farmers. One the one hand, the researchers from NRET (NRET: 1999) were unhappy 
about the use of co-operatives for marketing and channelling of inputs, which they compare 
with actions of the parastatals of the past. Furthermore, Mendoza and Bastiansen (2003) 
highlight the expensive and top-heavy administrative structure that characterise co-operatives. 
Thus, they maintain that a decentralised system of local brokers and traders is a more efficient 
way of trading. Lack of transparency and accountability, in addition to excessive 
representation costs, are further critiques against the co-operative structure which is 
mandatory in Fair Trade coffee production. On the other hand, Milford as well as Rice have a 
more positive view on the co-operative, maintaining that co-operatives in general have a 
positive price effect in local markets. Other possible advantages include economies of scale in 
purchases and sales, as well as a possibility for increased social cohesion (Milford, 2004; 
Rice, 2001) 
 
6.2.2. Benefits in agricultural markets 
 
This section leans heavily on the analysis of Milford (2004). 
Agricultural markets are often oligopsonies because of high transport costs that limit farmers’ 
access to buyers and due to farmers’ investment in sunk assets that creates exit barriers. 
If only a few purchasing firms are active at the local level, there is a possibility of collusive 
behaviour. When purchasing firms interact repeatedly, they may take not only their current 
profit but their future profit into account, possibly creating a cartel that sustains a low farm 
price level. According to Milford this outcome seems to obtain in many instances in third 
world agricultural markets. (Milford: 2004) 
 
When growers own their own processing facility and run it as a co-operative, they can retain 
the margin otherwise captured by private processors. This should have the effect of both 




prices to more competitive levels, as they would otherwise lose market shares to the co-
operative. (Milford: 2004) The existence of a co-operative and the higher prices it can present 
to members is also a signal to non-members that there is an alternative to the price levels of 
private firms, thus enabling the co-operative to act as a "pacemaker" (Levay quoted in 
Milford: 2004, 27)  or "barometer of exploitation" (Helmberger quoted in Milford: 2004, 27) 
 
According to Milford (2004), even if co-operatives would be less efficient than private firms, 
there are still reasons for supporting the existence of co-operatives. A subsidy to a co-
operative that is less efficient than a private firm can prevent the private firm(s) from gaining 
monopsony status, thus increasing competition and subsequently the price level for the 
farmers. However, a subsidy can also create a market distortion if it increases the co-operative 
price level beyond the competitive price. The Fair Trade premium can have a positive effect 
on the price level received by all farmers in a production area, through the mechanism of 
increased competition vis-a-vis private firms, as the latter have to increase prices to remain a 
competitive choice for farmers’ sales decisions. 
According to Milford (2004), the potential economic benefits of co-operatives include 
increased competitiveness, economies of scale, credit opportunities, innovation and member 
education. In fields such as transport, processing and the acquisition of market information a 
joint venture should perform better than if all farmers would act individually.  
The economies of scale of the co-operative extend to the market for credit and to the 
attainment of collective goods such as roads, vehicles, local stores, etc. A co-operative can 
furthermore be an efficient medium for the transfer of information, both internally among 
farmers and externally towards the rest of society. In conclusion, Milford argues that the 
benefits of co-operatives are not solely economical; they have a social side as well, being 
grassroots organisations that bring people together, creating social capital, and nurturing a 
process of empowerment and democratisation. (Milford: 2004). 
Another view on the cooperative is presented by Ruben (Ruben ed.: 2008) 
According to Ruben many farmers view co-operatives as a necessary evil that is required to 
enter the Fair Trade market, to some extent because co-operatives can be prone to 
mismanagement, or even outright fraud and embezzlement, just like any other public or 
private organisation. 
What the actual results are on the ground, is a question that is attempted to be answered by 






6.2.3. Possible disadvantages 
 
There are some possible disadvantages to co-operatives when comparing them with private 
companies. Free riding by less active members, higher costs of control due to less efficient 
control mechanisms, lack of investments due to risk aversion, and shorter horizon and 
conflicting objectives due to the dual social and economic character of the co-operative are 
factors that potentially lead to suboptimal efficiency levels. Moreover, co-operatives in many 
developing countries are usually characterised by delayed payment, something which allows 
local purchasers that are usually linked to highly liquid international traders to offer lower 
prices.  (Milford: 2004). 
The importance of delayed payment can be exemplified by the situation in Chiapas, Mexico, 
where most coffee farmers have to take on loans just before the coming harvest to cover for 
operational costs, because last year’s payment has already been spent. The only loans 
available to farmers are usually those of local coyotes, as banks are unwilling to lend to small 
scale farmers. Therefore interest rates can be exorbitant, between ten and  twenty per cent per 
month. In addition, coffee farmers are usually obliged to sell their coffee to the moneylender 
at prices lower than the market price. Failing to fulfil this obligation means that growers are 
denied future credit - from any intermediary - as coyotes work collusively, dividing market 
areas amongst themselves, both in the credit and the coffee market. (Milford: 2004). 
The unfavorable observations made by Milford in Chiapas can be contrasted with the results 
obtained by Valkila (personal communication, 2006) in Nicaragua, where coffee farmers 
could transform part (or all) of their harvest into credit with coffee exporting companies, at an 
interest rate of 10% per annum.  
 
6.2.4. Co-operatives as exogenous institutions 
 
Fair Trade has a heavy commitment towards the co-operative as the prime choice of 
organisation for Fair Trade production. Indigenous forms of organisations are rarely 
supported or analysed. Thus, one could argue that the introduction of trade unions or co-
operatives in communities where these organisations are alien might cause various kinds of 
problems. According to NRET, (NRET: 1999) the choice of co-operative as the form of 
organisation for Fair Trade "seems to in some cases to be as much ideologically as efficiency 
motivated." (NRET: 1999, 35) NRET also criticises the vilification of local trading 





6.2.5. Management and outside constraints 
 
Rice (2001) highlights certain aspects that determine the functioning of a Fair Trade producer 
group. Managerial skill at the executive level is very important for the producer group to 
function properly. Also, knowledge of economic practice and theory are emphasized, as 
producer groups are not development or charitable organisations per se, but business ventures 
that are subject to the same conditions as all economic activity. Moreover, Rice points out the 
potential lack of support from established government and/or business agencies that feel 
threatened by the different approach to production and consumption that Fair Trade offers. 
For instance, Rice cites examples from El Salvador and Mexico that banks (El Salvador) and 
state technicians (Mexico) were tying credit approval to the use of synthetic agrochemical 
output, thus sidestepping the commitment of FT to ecological values and the ban on many 
pesticides. Moreover, there were instances of exclusion of Fair Trade producer groups from 
important informational channels concerning markets, price changes, commodity chain 
adjustments, etc. This exclusion was done by, as Rice puts it, “specific social circles”. (Rice: 
2001, 57-8) 
 
Another problem is the tension that might emerge between business necessities and the 
democratic process within a Fair Trade cooperative. This is a part of a larger managerial 
question that concerns the right form of organisation for different endeavours, i.e. the ideal 
level of management at all levels of a productive venture. (Rice: 2001)  
In cooperatives growers have usually been in charge of financial matters, thus there might be 
reluctance on the part of the growers to relinquish the control over the financial decisions in a 
FT cooperative to the managerial staff, especially if the complexities surrounding commodity 
pricing and Fair Trade regulations, etc. are not widely known. (Rice: 2001) 
The competition and the less than encouraging environment that FT producer organisations 
faced during the coffee crisis were not exclusively linked to forces outside the FT system. 
Even ‘allies’ within the system pressured FT cooperatives. As managers could request up to 
60% of their final payment as pre-payment, the producing cooperatives often requested some 
pre-payment so as to ease cash flow problems occurring during the year. However, as this 
kind of lending on the part of FT importers was a strain on their financial position, they were 
sometimes unwilling to adhere to the set regulations, instead trying to sidestep their duties by 




producing cooperative not demand all its rightful prepayment. As the lack of funds that 
afflicts Fair Trade producers before the sale of next year’s harvest is the one of the problems 
that the FT system has tried to remedy, one can ask what progress is made when FT actors 
themselves tried to sidestep this issue. (Rice: 2001) 
 
7. Case studies  
 
This section is divided into the following parts. At first a case study on the FT value chain 
will be presented and analysed. Afterwards, three case studies of cooperatives producing FT  
coffee will be presented and analysed.   
 
7.1. Case study 1 - A Value Chain analysis: Nestlé-Sainsbury vs. 
Prodecoop-Cafédirect 
 
Mendoza and Bastiansen (Mendoza and Bastiansen: 2003) compare the value chain of instant 
coffee in the conventional Nestlé-Sainsbury chain with that of the Prodecoop-Cafédirect. 13 
Their data originates from informants at different stages of the value chain as well as 











13 PRODECOOP, Promotora de Desarollo Cooperativo de Las Segovias, is based in the Segovia region of 
northern Nicaragua, consisting of  40 co-operatives and 2,318 families in the early 2000s. The co-operative was 
established in 1993 to provide assistance to its member families in sustainable production and the marketing of 





Table 3. Estimated price composition of instant coffee 1996-2001.  US$/kilogram of coffee beans (in 2003 USD) 
(from Mendoza and Bastiansen: 2003, modified by the author) *These data are informed estimates by Mendoza and 
Bastiansen. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from table 3? The first conclusion one should make, is that 
the study of Mendoza and Bastiansen (2003) is analysing only one Fair Trade and one 
conventional coffee product, thus limiting the possibility to draw any generalised conclusions 
from this study.  Nevertheless, one straightforward observation is that Prodecoop-Cafédirect 
(Fair Trade) coffee was more expensive than its "conventional" counterpart for the consumer. 
In 2001 the Fair Trade product was 70 per cent more expensive than Nestlé's product. This 
mark-up in price is can be traced along the value chain with consistently higher prices (and 
implicitly perhaps less efficiency) for the Fair Trade product from the cost of processing all 
the way to advertising and retailing. This is perhaps due to the small scale of Fair Trade 
products. Even though Fair Trade and conventional producers in 1996 received a similar price 
for their produce, in 2001 - at the low point of the coffee crisis - the difference between 
producer prices was dramatic, with Fair Trade producers receiving almost three times as 
                                                    Conventional value chain                                         Fair Trade value chain 
                                                         Nestlé-Sainsbury                                                        Prodecoop-Cafédirect 
                                                     1996        2001       % change                                  1996         2001       % change 
Final consumer price:              10.6            9.4              -11%                                      14.2           16.0        +13% 
 
Wholesale and 
retail margin:                            2.6             3.1*             +19%                                     3.9              4.8         +21% 
 
Marketing licence:                     0                  0                  0                                         0.26           0.31         +19% 
  
Advertising:                              0.66             0.62             -6%                                       1.9              2.2         +21% 
 
Roasting, storage, transport 
finance:                                     4.8                 4.3*            -11%                                    5.1              5.9         +15% 
  
FOB price Nicaragua:             2.64               1.41             -46%                                   2.91            2.64          -9% 
 
Export taxes and fees:              0.15               0.11            -31%                                    0.20             0.15        -13% 
 
Processing, transport, 
finance:                                      0.53               0.62             +15%                                 0.57             0.66       +13% 
 





much income from their coffee than conventional Nicaraguan coffee farmers. Even though 
Mendoza's and Bastiansen's table uses kilograms as its measuring unit, I will convert the data 
using the Imperial system, i.e. into pounds, as it follows international pricing patterns. 
It is interesting to note that the Fair Trade price paid to producers  was  0.92$/lb. in 1996 and  
0.85$/lb. in 2001 even though the minimum Fair Trade price of coffee paid to producer 
organisations was 1.26$/lb. Thus the farmers received a lower price in 2001 than in 1996 
even though Fair Trade coffee explicitly guaranteed a minimum price higher than the price 
received.  The gap between 1.26$/lb. and  the amount paid to the producers 14 is perhaps due 
to administrative and other costs of the producer co-operative, such as education of the 
farmers, storage of coffee, dry processing of coffee, or costs linked to exporting coffee and 
transportation. Another possibility is the inclusion of all coffee sold in this price (not just Fair 
Trade coffee) as Prodecoop managed to sell only approximately half of its coffee at fair tade 
prices. (Mendoza and Bastiansen: 2003) 
According to Valkila (personal communication, 2006), the expenditures for Nicaraguan coffee 
cooperatives are in the range of 30 US cents per pound of coffee, so this estimate fits the 
abovementioned analysis quite well. 
 
Production costs of raw coffee in the Segovias region of Nicaragua were estimated at between 
0.25$/lb. and 0.40$/lb around the year 2000. As the conventional producer prices in 2001 (of 
0.31$/lb.) hardly cover production costs the implications are clear. Conventional coffee 
production in 2001 in Nicaragua was barely - or not at all - profitable. Furthermore, many 
commercial farmers had to sell their crop in advance to cover costs. The price of coffee sold 
in this way was approximately half of that sold at the harvest. In contrast, the Prodecoop 
provided credit at a real interest rate of 18 per cent/annum. (Mendoza and Bastiansen: 2003) 
  
The life of the Fair Trade farmer was nevertheless not as profitable as can be surmised at a 
cursory glance. This is mainly due to the limited scope of the Fair Trade market; farmers 
linked with Prodecoop were able to sell only half of their harvest at Fair Trade prices, 
(Mendoza and Bastiansen: 2003) while the rest was sold at conventional prices, a recurring 
theme among Fair Trade certified co-operatives. (Ruben ed.: 2008) 
The higher price, that the finished Fair Trade product commanded at the consumer end, was 
mainly due to higher producer prices, but also due to inefficiencies or rent capture in the 
 




value chain. Even though the retail price of conventional coffee fell by -11% from 1996 to 
2001 it rose by +13% for Fair Trade coffee! 
All costs outside of the producing country rose as supermarkets became less willing to accept 
Cafédirect coffee, thus increasing the retail margin (to induce supermarkets to accept 
Cafédirect coffee and to make up for lower volumes) and advertising costs. Nevertheless, the 
brunt of the falling coffee prices were put on the producers in the conventional chain, whereas 
it was put on the consumers in the Fair Trade chain. 15 Another conclusion that can be drawn 
is that of an existing and tangible power imbalance. The power imbalances along the supply 
chain become evident as the retail margin for the Nestlé-Sainsbury coffee increases from 
1996 to 2001 even though producer price decreases drastically. One further conclusion that 
can be drawn is that Fair Trade, in this particular case at least, has been a very inefficient 
transfer of funds to producers. At the retail end, the Fair Trade consumer pays 3.00$ more per 
lb. of coffee than the one shopping at Sainsbury. At the producer level, the Fair Trade grower 
received 0.85$/lb. whereas the one growing for Nestlé got 0.31$/lb. The retail difference of 
3.00$/lb. has dwindled to 0.54$/lb at the producer level. Nevertheless, the Fair Trade grower 
earns almost twice as much as the Nestlé grower, if he is able to sell half of his coffee through 
Fair Trade channels.16 Still, one is warranted to ask if a Fair Trade consumer would rather 
make a donation of three U.S. dollars directly to the grower (perhaps with handling fees of 
10-20 %), than see her 3.00$ premium lose four-fifths of its value at the producer level.17 
 
There are not many studies on the whole Fair Trade value chain from the time of the coffee 
crisis. The study of Valkila et al. (2010), even though outside the proper timeframe, will be 
referenced to briefly, as it provides the counterfactual comparison to the time of the coffee 
crisis. 
In short, the results of the study of Valkila et al. (2010) – conducted in Nicaragua in 2005-
2006 - indicate that farmers selling to the conventional market got similar prices for their 
coffee as their FT counterparts (as coffee prices had risen above the Fair Trade floor price). 
Another result is that of the retail price of FT coffee, the majority (60%) was retained in the 
consumer country (Finland) and only some 35% in the producer country of Nicaragua. These 
 
15 Prices fell by -64% from 1996 to 2001 for conventional producers, but only by -10% for Fair Trade producers.  
However, as prices fell for conventional consumers by -11% they rose for Fair Trade consumers by +13%. 
16 0.85$ * 0.5 (Half of the Prodecoop coffee is sold through Fair Trade channels) +  0.31$ * 0.5 (The other half is 
sold through normal channels) = 0.58 $. This is the mean price that the Fair Trade grower receives per pound of 
coffee sold through FT and normal channels. 




results are good to bear in mind as we continue to analyse the case studies on Fair Trade 
coffee during the coffee crisis. 
 
 
7.2. Case study 2 - Fair Trade coffee co-operatives in Mexico 
 
7.2.1. ISMAM and KAFFE 
The study of Milford (2004) on which I am leaning on in this segment, 
focuses on two co-operatives, namely ISMAM (Indigenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla) 
and KAFFE. At the time for Milford's study there were are 36 FLO-registered coffee co-
operatives in Mexico, of which many were situated in the Chiapas region. These co-
operatives were all marketing co-operatives, i.e. co-operatives that purchase the coffee that 
members themselves produce. The co-operatives were in charge of processing and exporting 
the produced coffee abroad. 
ISMAM is the result of a project initiated by the Catholic church of Tapachula in 1985. 
During the coffee crisis the organisation had around 1300 members, dispersed over a very 
large area. In the year 2000, 62,551 bags of coffee were produced adding up to ca. 9 million 
USD in revenue. Around 20 percent of the coffee received a Fair Trade premium. Only 
organic coffee was exported, whereas organic and conventional coffee was sold locally. 
KAFFE is a second-degree co-operative, that exports the coffee of a number of independent 
coffee producing co-operatives. The operational costs of KAFFE were covered partly by the 
members of the producer co-operatives (60%) and the rest was paid by FLO and the NGO 
Twin Trading. (Milford: 2004) 
During the time of the coffee crisis, coffee producers in Chiapas had various options when 
selling their product. One option was to take the coffee bags to one of the cities where 
processing companies and exporters maintained their offices and storage rooms. This was an 
option that mainly large producers used, as the road network in Chiapas was in poor condition 
and as most farmers lived in remote areas without access to proper vehicles. Another option 
was to sell to private intermediaries (coyotes), businessmen with vehicles of their own, who 
received a prepayment from processing companies and roamed the countryside in search for 
purchasable coffee. The intermediaries paid farmers when the coffee was handed over, and 
the price was usually lower than that of the processing companies and exporters in the cities. 





7.2.2. An analysis of the Chiapan case study 
 
According to the case study conducted by Milford (Milford: 2004) some of the theoretical 
assumptions regarding co-operatives obtain in the Chiapan case. The market structure is one 
that is characterised by imperfect competition among private purchasers. Price levels offered 
by private purchasers are higher in areas with co-operative presence. As co-operatives are 
linked to organic and Fair Trade markets, they are able to pay a higher price than their private 
competitors. As co-operatives remain open18 to new members there is pressure on private 
purchasers to maintain competitive price levels. Furthermore, the co-operatives functioned as 
educational organisations, providing members with information about prices and quality of 
the products, which in turn managed to lose the hold that intermediaries had over farmers. 
The experience from Chiapas was that coffee co-operatives were economically disadvantaged 
in competition with private exporting companies, especially with large ones that did not have 
problems of liquidity. But the co-operatives investigated by Milford still managed to succeed. 
They were functioning economic organisations that also ran social programmes such as 
education schemes. And Milford concludes that it is unlikely that the Chiapan co-operatives 
would have functioned just as well without the premium of Fair Trade. Fair Trade enabled co-
operatives to act as viable alternatives to private purchasers, thus increasing competition and 
price levels. The direct access to international markets and the prepayment of Fair Trade 
buyers was seen as important among co-operative members, however, the yearly visits from 
the Fair Trade monitor and Fair Trade conditions were perceived to be of little importance. 
(Milford: 2004). According to Milford (2004) FLO only supported existing and strong co-
operatives, not unorganised farmers or undemocratic and unsuccessful co-operatives. Many of 
the co-operatives that were linked to Fair Trade were originally set up by NGO or government 
initiatives, and showed high levels of independence and member participation. (Milford: 
2004). Thus one can ask if other - newly formed - co-operatives would have fared as well as 




18 The openness is conditional, however, as e.g. membership fees or compulsory organic 




7.3. Case study 3 - CEPCO - 2003-2004 
 
CEPCO (La Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café del Estado de Oaxaca 
A.C.)  was the largest coffeemarketing cooperative in the Mexican state of Oaxaca in the early 
2000s. In the 2003/4 season CEPCO had all of its coffee certified as Fair Trade and paid 
producers US$0.32/lb for conventional FT coffee and US$0.66/lb for organic FT coffee. 
While these prices might seem low compared to the price received by organisations from 
buyers on international markets, unorganised producers selling to local intermediaries 
received even less. In the same region, producers of conventional coffee received 40 percent 
less than Fair Trade producers. (Calo and Wise: 2005) 
Even though the case study of Calo and Wise was conducted at the latter stages of the coffee 
crisis, one can conclude that coffee prices obtained for producers, at least in Oaxaca, had not 
returned to pre-crisis levels. 
During the time of the case study, the cost of FT certification that previously had been the 
sole responsibility of FLO was transferred to some extent to producer organisations. Fair 
Trade certification had been relatively inexpensive for CEPCO, even though costs had risen 
towards the years 2003-2004. With a membership of 42 producer organisations representing 
16,000 growers, CEPCO initially paid 4,400 Euros for the certification. Additionally, there 
were yearly expenses for certification and registration with FLO. CEPCO also supported a 
regional FLO office monetarily. (Calo and Wise: 2005) 
CEPCO succeeded in selling a large share of its coffee through Fair Trade channels. In 2003/4 
Fair Trade sales exceeded 90 percent of total sales. Regardless of the origin or the quality of 
the coffee, all producers benefited from Fair Trade sales, as the premium was incorporated 
into CEPCO’s internal price structure for coffee in different markets. A part of the earnings 
remained at the organisational level to fund joint projects agreed upon by the membership; 
these costs may have exceed the FT social premium of five cents per pound. (Calo and Wise: 
2005) 
 
7.4. Case study 4 - The Michiza producer cooperative 
 
Daniel Jaffee researched coffee producing Zapotec communities in the Rincón de Ixtlán 
region of the Mexican state of Oaxaca between October 2001 and February 2004 (Jaffee: 




parchment19 coffee annually from its members, consisting of some 1,100 families, 
representing six different indigenous ethnic groups.   
80% of the coffee was of export quality and sold through Fair Trade channels. The remaining 
20% was sold domestically at lower prices. At the time of the study, Michiza had been selling 
Fair Trade coffee for more than 15 years, thus allowing for ample and robust results regarding 
the impact of FT. 
 
7.4.1. Economic impacts 
 
At the end of the 2002-2003 harvest, producers in the Rincón de Ixtlán region not belonging 
to Michiza, selling their coffee to local coyotes received approximately five pesos/kg20 of 
coffee. Michiza members who were transitioning to organic FT coffee received approximately 
double the amount, and producers who sold organic FT coffee received three times as much. 
These differences persisted until the 2004-2005 harvest, when international coffee prices had 




Table 4.  Michiza payments to producers and Coyote prices, 2002-2005. 
      2002-03  2003-04                 2004-05 
Michiza FT organic coffee            USD  0.68/lb            USD  0.71/lb                       USD  0.79/lb 
Michiza FT            USD  0.45/lb            USD  0.56/lb            USD  0.70/lb 
Coyote price            USD  0.23lb            USD  0.23/lb            USD  0.76lb 
(from Jaffee: 2008 in Ruben ed.: 2008, modified by the author) 
 
The data in table 4 strongly suggest at least two things. Firstly the minimum Fair Trade price 
(see appendix 2), which at the time was 1.21 USD/lb (+0.15 USD for organic + 0.05 USD 
social premium) did not reach producers. Secondly, Fair Trade functioned as a cushion for FT 
producers during the worst part of the crisis, granting them clear economic benefits over their 
conventional counterparts. Nevertheless, as world coffee prices started to creep up towards 
normal levels (reaching 1.00+ USD/lb in early 2005), these benefits evaporated and probably 
reversed (as FT coffee is more more labour-intensive, and thus more expensive to produce). 
 
19Dried but unhulled coffee, i.e. coffee beans before the "pergamino" parchment skin is removed. 




A further finding from Jaffee's study is the fact that less than half of the total cash income for 
FT coffee producing families came from coffee sales. Moreover, the amount of cash income 
from coffee sales was very low, some 230 US$ net/annum (not counting countless hours of 
unpaid family labour). Non-FT producers had it even worse, reaching a net income of some 
48US$/annum.  Both FT and non-FT producers had a net negative household income during 
the time researched, i.e. "were in the red rather than the black". (Jaffee: 2008 in Ruben ed.: 
2008) 
As Michiza provided pre-harvest financing, fewer cooperative members reported needing to 
borrow money every year (29.2%) than the conventional farmers (57%). Labour time and 
costs for FT producers were significantly higher than for conventional farmers (310 USD vs. 
98 USD), due to the additional work needed both for organic standards as well as the high 
quality demanded by export markets. (Jaffee: 2008 in Ruben ed.: 2008) 
At the height of the coffee crisis many conventional producers faced malnutrition, even 
though subsistence farming is a common practice in the region. Furthermore, Fair Trade 
producers reported significantly higher levels of food security than their conventional 
counterparts. (Jaffee: 2008 in Ruben ed.: 2008) 
 
7.4.2. Other impacts 
 
One striking finding - one that stands in stark contrast to many FT publications - is that family 
members of FT producers were twice as likely to have migrated than their conventional 
counterparts. Jaffee offers the explanation of Arjan de Haan to this conundrum: "The 
extremely poor /.../ are generally excluded from migration opportunities." (De Haan cited in 
Jaffee: 2008, 210) 
Further findings include an increase of coffee yields among organic farmers, of some 40% 
over their conventional counterparts, due to organic plot maintenance such as weeding and 
pruning. Another benefit of organic (FT) farming is the continuation of shade coffee21 
ecosystems, with their "extraordinary [levels of] biodiversity"(Jaffee: 2008, 211 in Ruben ed.: 
2008). Moreover, while 80% of FT producers had a positive view of their continuation of 
farming only 54.5% of conventional farmers gave the same answer. And in many cases where 
coffee farming was abandoned, farmers razed the plots (thus the whole ecosystem) to plant 
maize. (Jaffee: 2008 in Ruben ed.: 2008) 
 




One important spillover effect from FT farming seen in the Rincón de Ixtlán region is that 
some organic practices adopted by FT farmers were incorporated by conventional farmers as 
well, including composting and terrace building (even though these farmers had no chance of 
getting organic certification), thus giving validity to the claim that FT can function as a 
positive example or benchmark for local communities. 
Finally, Jaffee concludes that for the families living in Rincón de Ixtlán, Fair Trade was  
"necessary, but not sufficient". (Jaffee: 2008, 215 in Ruben ed.: 2008) 
 
  
8. Analysis - the impact of Fair Trade coffee during the 
coffee crisis 
 
8.1. Economic impacts 
 
8.1.1 Increased revenue 
 
The most obvious benefit of Fair Trade coffee during the coffee crisis was the minimum floor 
price of $1.21 per pound plus the social premium of $.05 above that minimum or above the 
world price (something that did not obtain during the coffee crisis). (Nigh: 2002)  
Thus Fair Trade producers received a significant boost of revenue, as evidenced in all of the 
case studies. Nevertheless, some coffee co-operatives managed to sell only a fraction of their 
produced coffee as FT coffee, thus limiting the economic impact of FT coffee. 
The most positive views on revenues come from research conducted during the coffee crisis, 
with Murray et al. (2003) and Raynolds (2002) presenting a very positive picture of Fair 
Trade premiums. The reasons for this positive picture can be many, such as the composition 
of the producer groups, the exact time of research - as coffee prices dove sharply from 1998 
to 2002 - and how much coffee the co-operatives managed to sell at Fair Trade prices. 
 
 
During the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, world coffee prices rarely rose above 
the Fair Trade floor price. Around the turn of the millennium many Latin American coffee 




USD per pound of coffee that they got from local middlemen to actually harvest the coffee.  
Raynolds (2002) maintains that Nicaraguan coffee producers who belonged to cooperatives 
linked to alternative markets, were four times less likely to report that they were at risk of 
losing their land than other coffee producers. According to an estimate around the year 2000, 
growers that were a part of the Fair Trade system received an annual income of around $2000, 
whereas if they would be selling their coffee in conventional markets they would only be 
receiving around $500. (Raynolds: 2002) 
 
8.1.2. Stability and finance 
 
A higher price was not necessarily the impact most sought-after by Fair Trade producers 
during the coffee crisis; indeed Kocken maintains that the long-term relationship, advance 
payment and the certainty of price received were more important factors for producers than 
the price premium. (Kocken quoted in Moore: 2004) 
Regarding the impact of the stable pricing, there are at least two radically different views. 
One view is exemplified by Zehner (2002), whereas the other can be traced in the writings of 
Murray et al. (2003) According to Zehner, Fair Trade does reduce price volatility in theory, as 
it guarantees a stable price.  Moreover, in theory, reduced risk might encourage growers to 
make investments that would not otherwise have been made. Nevertheless, as most growers 
sell only part of their products via the Fair Trade channel, price volatility is still a 
phenomenon that affects them.  
Murray et al. (2003) present another view, i.e. that producers within the Fair Trade system are 
experiencing a more stable economic and social situation where planning for future 
production and consumption is easier because of the stable minimum price for Fair Trade 
products and due to improved credit availability. (Murray et al. 2003) 
Of the case studies analysed, only Jaffee's (2008 in Ruben ed.: 2008) was conducted over 
many harvest cycles, thus giving more depth to claims about the importance of price stability. 
Price stability was not explicitly mentioned by the Michiza cooperative members as an 
important positive part of belonging to the FT system, even though they were more optimistic 
about the future of their coffee farming than their conventional counterparts, thus 
corroborating the claim of Murray et al. (2003) that FT encourages growers to invest, perhaps 





The benefit of a floor price can be viewed as a mixed blessing, as some critics suggest that it 
may be unsustainable in prolonged periods of low prices, and that it limits the reach of Fair 
Trade networks by compromising the profitability of Fair Trade importers (Renard: 1999). 
According to Raynolds (2002), the largest part of the price premium is retained by producer 
co-operatives. However, there are counterexamples where growers receive the lion's share 
(Ruben ed.: 2008).  
If the price premium from Fair Trade is retained at the association level, then producers are 
unlikely to be aware that Fair Trade networks offer either premiums or price floors. This lack 
of information at the producer level lead to ambivalence toward Fair Trade during the coffee 
crisis (Raynolds: 2002). 
According to Raynolds (2002) Larger Fair Trade associations tended to pool the revenues 
gathered from the different markets (conventional, organic, Fair Trade, etc.) and divided the 
sum among the members, something that can be viewed as positive from an equity point of 
view, however possibly leading to a situation where there was little knowledge about Fair 
Trade practices and little incentive for growers to improve their practices. As one cornerstone 
of Fair Trade is price invariability, this may have presented perverse incentives to growers, or 
grower associations. 
 
Fair Trade certification requires that coffee importers establish long-term purchasing 
agreements directly with producer groups. This secure market outlet is an important benefit 
for Fair Trade producers, even though few producer organisations sold all their harvest 
through Fair Trade networks during the coffee crisis. The variance between FT producer 
cooperatives is exemplified by the case studies presented above, namely that ISMAM 
managed to sell only 20% of its coffee as FT (Milford: 2004), while CEPCO managed to sell 
90% (Calo and Wise: 2005), and Michiza sold all of its export quality coffee to the FT 
market. (Jaffee: 2008 in Ruben ed.: 2008) 
 
Similarly the access to finance provided by importers at Northern market rates was an 
important benefit, as poor coffee farmers traditionally have been heavily indebted to local 
brokers as the annual harvest approaches. Local moneylenders usually charge excessive rates 
and banks are rarely interested in financing small farmers. Murray et al. (2003) report that 
The Las Colinas cooperative in El Salvador received up to 60% pre-financing for its FT 
coffee during the coffee crisis at half the interest rates of national banks. Cooperatives 




institutions, due to the long term commitment of their buyers and the external monitoring 
carried out by Fair Trade organisations. (Murray et al.: 2003) 
According to Raynolds (2002), the inherent hierarchy of many trading operations dissolved in 
the Fair Trade network. Furthermore, feelings of dignity, and equality with other actors along 
the commodity chain are representative of Fair Trade networks according to Raynolds (2002). 
Nevertheless, this finding should be taken with a pinch of salt as other observers do not note 
similar tendencies. (Ruben ed., 2008; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010) 
 
8.1.3. Technical expertise and market information 
 
The technical expertise and market information provided by Fair Trade networks were as 
important as the price premiums, according to some studies. (Raynolds, 2002; Nigh, 2002; 
Murray et al., 2003) Indeed, according to Raynolds (2002) improved access to information 
and a more transparent market are generally the outcome of participation in Fair Trade 
networks. Raynolds continues to paint a rosy picture of the FT network, as according to her, 
the roles of importer and producer are viewed not as confrontational in a Fair Trade network 
as in normal trade networks. Moreover, the joint development of new products or product 
lines, the adaptation of products to suit Northern tastes and fashions and the access to new 
marketing channels are all potential benefits of the less hostile trade environment according to 
Raynolds (2002). 
The majority of the case studies carried out by the Fair Trade Research Group of the Colorado 
State University22 concluded that Fair Trade enables the exchange of information leading to 
new commercial opportunities for producers. (Murray et al. 2003) 
However, there is, in general, limited knowledge among coffee producers about the tastes of 
consumers in the North as well as about the international coffee market. (Murray et al. 2003) 
 
8.1.4. Product diversification 
 
Dependency on a single commodity has had a disastrous effect on many countries and 
communities in the developing world. Fair Trade has been an attempt to alleviate this 
 
22
 The Fair Trade Research Group at the Colorado State University carried out seven case studies (published in 





dependency by providing stability to the commodity market. Within some cooperatives 
involved with Fair Trade coffee, growers were encouraged to diversify their production to 
include other commercial crops as well as handicrafts. (Murray et al.: 2003) 
Nevertheless Lyon (Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) gives an account of the difficulty for Mayan 
women in accessing markets for their weaving products, while their husbands reapt the 
benefits of belonging to the Fair Trade coffee system. Still other observers conclude that Fair 
Trade "seems to enhance /.../ certain specialization in coffee, partly because other income 
earning options are scarce."(Sáenz-Segura and Zúñiga-Arias: 2008, 133, in Ruben ed.: 2008) 
 
8.2. Non-economic impacts 
 
8.2.1. Organisational impacts 
 
Early research on Fair Trade was to some extent just echoing claims made by FLO or other 
Fair Trade organisations. Some early observers, such as Tallontire (2001a; 2001b)  viewed the 
financial impact of Fair Trade as less than might be expected from Fair Trade publicity 
material and instead viewed the development of institutional and organisational capacity as 
the most important positive FT impact. According to Tallontire (2001a) the ongoing 
discussion with Fair Trade organisations helped co-operatives to develop their capacity to 
function in the market, through the improvement of technical and business skills. However, if 
the transfer of business and technical skills was the main advantage of Fair Trade, then one 
could perhaps ask if there are more efficient and cheaper ways of conveying this knowledge 
than through the creation of an alternative trade system. 
 
According to Murray et al. (2003), one of the deepest impacts that Fair Trade made during the 
coffee crisis was at the organisational level, facilitating the growth of democratic institutions 
and organisational empowerment. The rigorous standards and frequent monitoring of FLO 
also encouraged producer organisations to improve their administrative capacity. (Murray et 
al., 2003; Raynolds, 2002) Fair Trade Producer organisations also became more visible in the 
eyes of the outside world; in El Salvador, members of the Las Colinas cooperative were able 
to receive earthquake relief funds through the FT organisation APECAFE much quicker than 




organisations were perceived to have more faith in FT organisations than in their conventional 
counterparts. (Mendez: 2002) 
 
8.2.2. Gender impacts 
 
Even though gender issues have been on the agenda within the Fair Trade movement, during 
the time of the coffee crisis a lot remained to be done in practice. 
The culture in many regions where Fair Trade is active (e.g. Central or South America), was - 
and is - male-dominated, and in many cases women had no or minor roles in commercial 
farming. It was usually the men who were granted membership to producer organisations 
under the assumption that they represent their spouses and children. (Raynolds: 2002) 
 
Lyon (2010, in Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) maintains that: 
 
...despite FLO's publicity efforts, a number of studies indicate that to date fair trade has failed to promote gender 
equity adequately. /.../ [F]air trade has largely failed to alter gender relations that historically been unequal. /.../ 
There is no direct correlation between the formation of more equitable North-South market relationships and the 
status of women. (Lyon: 2010, 131, in Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) 
 
Murray et al. (2003) present a differing view. 
According to them "Fair Trade has been one of the dynamic forces overcoming the isolation 
of women in cooperatives."(Murray et al.: 2003, 26) 
Lyon (2010, in Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) continues by maintaining that there are some 
silver linings to Fair Trade concerning gender relations, namely that regions with higher pre-
existing levels of gender equality have experienced more equitable gender relations through 
the participation in the FT network. 
 
 
8.2.3.  Social and environmental impacts 
 
According to the results of case studies carried out by the Fair Trade Research Group at 
Colorado State University at the time of the coffee crisis, Fair Trade did improve the well-




During the coffee crisis, farmers in the Chiapas-based Majomut cooperative experienced an 
increase in overall income in the range of 100 to 200 percent (Pérezgrovas Garza and 
Cervantes Trejo: 2002). Benefits to families included various social projects funded by the 
increased returns from Fair Trade sales, including more training and marketing assistance to 
as well as an improvement in children's education. Furthermore, there was some evidence that 
the possibility for families to earn their living by growing Fair Trade or organic coffee limited 
migration from areas dependent on coffee growth. As maintained by Jaffee (2008 in Ruben 
ed.: 2008) in the Michiza case study (presented in section 7.4), this effect is not entirely clear, 
as he maintains that migration among FT producers was higher than among conventional 
farmers. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that migration in this case was an opportunity, 
not a necessity, and something that was out of reach for the poorest strata of society. 
Another benefit concerns the living conditions of farmers participating in Fair Trade. 
According to Murray et al (2003) Fair Trade emphasises organic farming, increasing 
awareness about soil conservation and water management in many areas, thus helping to 
preserve the living environment of the farmers, something that is corroborated by the Michiza 
case study of Jaffee (2008 in Ruben ed., 2008). 
   
 
8.2.4. Creating debate and changing corporate culture 
 
According to Raynolds (2000), the true significance of alternative trade systems is not in the 
market value of the products traded, but lies instead "in the challenge they raise against the 
abstract capitalist relations that fuel exploitation in the agro-food system." (Raynolds 2000, 
297) Thus I would define Raynolds as propagating an idealist view on Fair Trade, as mainly a 
vehicle to change existing trading structures, rather than as a vehicle for ameliorating the 
practical day-to-day problems of the most vulnerable members of the international coffee 
commodity chain. 
One possible impact of Fair Trade, was the attitudinal change in conventional corporations 
during the time of the coffee crisis. According to Young (Young: 2003) the Fair Trade 
movement was at the vanguard of social responsibility for businesses during the turn of the 
century. Techniques pertaining to assessing and monitoring the social impact of business, 
such as social reporting techniques and labour codes of practice, were developed by the Fair 




By bringing ethical questions to the fore, organisations working with Fair Trade contributed 
to a corporate climate where ethics - at least on the surface - became more important in the 
pursuit of a successful business strategy. How much the Fair Trade initiative has impacted a 
more general change in putting ethics to the fore in corporate conduct during the last twenty 
years is a question that is outside the scope of this thesis, even though it is a very interesting 
one. 
Nevertheless, the years around the turn of the century witnessed the inception of many ethical 
initiatives along various value chains, such as a code of conduct implemented in the 
horticulture sector (Tallontire: 2001a), as well as the implementation of social and 
environmental codes of practice by many supermarkets towards their suppliers. (Collinson: 
2001) 
 
8.2.5. Personal impacts - cultural revival and creased self esteem 
 
According to Murray et al. (2003), visits from Fair Trade officials, importers and consumers 
engendered a feeling of worthiness and importance among farmers that in many cases were at 
the margins of society, with their traditional way of life threatened by slumping commodity 
prices. Furthermore, in this analysis, Fair Trade contributed to a cultural revival in indigenous 
communities, as ancestral farming techniques were reinstated, and many indigenous farmers 






9. Analysis - problems and limitations within the Fair Trade 
system 
 
9.1. Becoming a Fair Trade producer: serendipity or master plan? 
 
According to NRET (1999) the definitions of poverty in Fair Trade circles during the 
beginning of the coffee crisis were not as well-defined and nuanced as those used by 
international development agencies or the ones discussed in professional journals. The 
monitoring of Fair Trade focused on the immediate producers, not on the societies to which 
these producers belonged. Thus, hidden inequalities or problems rarely surfaced or were 
brought to the fore. Structural inequality or imbalances were rarely rectified and to some 
extent it could be warranted to say that Fair Trade during the coffee crisis focused on the 
symptoms and not necessarily the underlying causes of the problems in the communities 
where it was implemented. (NRET: 1999) 
During the time of the coffee crisis, many small farmers that fulfilled the Fair Trade criteria 
were not able to participate in the FT market due to limited sales. Furthermore,  farmers that 
were defined as "large farmers" were not allowed to produce FT coffee, even though they 
would have fulfilled the relevant social and environmental criteria. (Murray et al. 2003) 
In Mexico, the knowledge about Fair Trade coffee production spread mostly through the 
grapevine, with more and more producer organisations tagging along after seeing the success 
of initial Fair Trade producers. (Murray et al. 2003) In the midst of the coffee crisis, one view 
on the organisation of Fair Trade was presented by the manager of the Mexican La Selva 
cooperative, José Juárez. Juárez argued for a lowering of prices of FT goods in order to 
capture a larger market share. He also suggested that Fair Trade participation should be 
transitory, with successful organisations 'graduating' to conventional markets. Juárez voiced a 
- not uncommon - concern that Fair Trade participation during the crisis was dominated by 
well-organised cooperatives, entrenched in favourable positions. (Murray et al. 2003, 19) 
 
9.2. Fair Trade stakeholders  
 
Fair Trade tends to focus on one stakeholder, the primary producer. These primary producers 




vulnerable individuals, instead it could be appropriate to define the beneficiaries of Fair Trade 
as being small farmers in developing countries, rather than the most vulnerable people in 
these countries. At the time of the coffee crisis, gender issues were not at the heart of Fair 
Trade, as well as questions concerning labour relations within the smallholder household. 
Indeed, it is warranted to say that Fair Trade at the turn of the century focused more on 
contractual terms of trade rather than social or power relations within the sphere of 
production.  (Tallontire, 2001a; Tallontire, 2001b) 
  
9.3. Is Fair Trade remedying the wrong symptoms - inefficiently? 
 
According to some observers, Fair Trade is a small and inefficiently transferred subsidy. (e.g. 
Zehner, 2002; Lindsey, 2004)23  
Zehner (2002) maintains that FT growers might be better off in the short term; however, 
according to him this is probably not the case in the long term. Furthermore, in his opinion 
the critical assumption that underlies the Fair Trade concept is that the cause of poverty 
amongst coffee growers are the low prices that they receive. However, according to Zehner, 
low prices are a symptom of the power imbalances in the supply chain. (Zehner: 2002) 
In my opinion Zehner hits the nail on the head when he posits low prices as a symptom of an 
existing power imbalance. However, the manner of rectifying this imbalance is in my opinion 
a more open question. One could argue that Fair Trade tries to reconfigure the power 
structures prevalent in conventional trading systems through the elimination of middlemen. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that through the introduction of more transparent and 
democratic practices FT opens up tightly wound images of combative or conflicting interests 
at all levels of the supply chain.                                                                                                   
 
In the following section I will go along with one of the most critical voices against Fair Trade 
during the coffee crisis, namely David Zehner, in his analysis of Fair Trade. 
According to Zehner (2002), Fair Trade is a poor means of transferring wealth from 
consumers to producers. The foundation of the argument is an estimation of the distribution 
 
23 To some extent I see this view as warranted, based on the limited empiric evidence presented in this paper.  
For instance in the Nestlé-Sainsbury vs. Prodecoop-Cafédirect value chain analysis (mentioned in section 7) the 
subsidy that consumers pay is transferred quite inefficiently, as a premium of 6.60USD paid by the consumer 




of the Fair Trade retail price. Zehner estimates that around 70 percent of the Fair Trade 
premium was received by growers (the other 30 per cent goes to the producer co-operative) in 
June 2002. Zehner analyses Starbucks Fair Trade Blend, which includes a $1.50 price 
premium over its House Blend concluding that the grower recieves approximately $0.67 or 
45% of the retail price premium. Hence, he concludes that Fair Trade is an inefficient method 
of transferring income, unless market prices are extremely low. There is a caveat to this 
conclusion in my opinion, as Zehner views the revenue captured by the producing co-
operatives as something negative - probably seeing it as administrative costs or suchlike - 
whereas I would argue that the lion's share of the money that co-operatives receive can be 
used for communally important investments.                                                                                    
As he wraps up, Zehner makes a comparison with direct-transfer programs that normally have 
administrative expenses of 20 percent or less (an example he cites is World Vision, where 
17% of the revenue is spent on administration and fund-raising). Thus, he concludes that “a 
socially conscious consumer would add more to growers incomes by writing a check for 
$1.50 than by buying a pound of Fair Trade coffee.” (Zehner: 2002) Zehner acknowledges the 
existing critique against this stance, mentioning the possible “psychological effects” of 
earning a “fair” income through one’s work, instead of receiving a (potentially larger) money 
transfer. In my opinion Zehner disregards a veritable truism within academic discourse con 
development, namely that direct transfers, or any kind of resource transfer from developed 
into developing countries is usually wrought with problems or at least inefficiency. 
Nevertheless, if Zehner viewed a 45% transfer as inefficient one, has to bear in mind the even 
worse results (for FT proponents) of Mendoza and Bastiansen (2003) as only 20% of the 
consumer premium was transferred to FT producers in their case study presented in section 
7.1.  A weightier critique, in my mind, against Fair Trade that Zehner (2002) presents, are the 
distortions of incentive that Fair Trade can create. The existing price floor can remove a 
grower’s incentive to upgrade production, improve product quality or switch crops. (Zehner, 
2002; Bacon, 2005) 
 
9.4. Fair Trade and the conventional market 
 
Fair Trade has its roots in small-scale artesanal trade. In this form of trade, the key 
stakeholder was the producer. As food products were introduced, and as products were 




arose a necessity to both distinguish and guarantee the “fairness” of Fair Trade products. 
Thus, Fair Trade labels and labelling organisations were introduced. An interesting approach 
from established retailers was the conventionalizing of the Fair Trade “brand”, through 
initiatives that created “own brand” Fair Trade products. These products were under the label 
of the retailer in question and were sourced directly from producers without involving ATOs 
as middlemen. One example was the Co-operative supermarket group based in the U.K. 
(Moore: 2004) 
The conventionalizing of Fair Trade is surrounded by certain problems. One of the problems 
that exists is the profit margin that the retailers capture when selling Fair Trade products. For 
example, in 2002 coffee shop giant Starbucks paid an average of $1.20/pound excluding 
freight for green coffee, while it paid $ 1.26/pound for non-organic and $ 1.41 for organic 
green arabica that was also Fair Trade marked. Even though Starbucks paid a small premium 
for the Fair Trade coffee, the ratio between retail and producer prices is higher for Fair Trade 
coffee. While the Fair Trade coffee of Starbucks sold at a premium of 7 to 15% when 
compared with non-FT coffee, the payment increase to producers was only 5%. (Anderson 
and Riedl: 2004) One can argue that the bigger margin for Fair Trade coffee was due to 
smaller volumes and the need to advertise the product, etc. However, one can argue that 
Starbucks reaped both an economic and a PR-benefit from Fair Trade. Thus, Fair Trade was 
both good business, when looked at in purely economic terms as well as good business when 
questions of corporate image and brand strength were concerned. 
 
The entry of big conventional actors into the FT value chain can be viewed either as 
potentially harmful or beneficial to FT aims, depending on whether one sees FT more as an 
attempt to change the structure of world trade or to ameliorate the effects of worsening terms 
of trade for a select number of primary producers. 
If one views the aims of Fair Trade as maximising monetary benefits to producers, then 
increased sales - in whatever shape or form they take - is beneficial. However, if challenging 
existing trading practices is the aim, the fact that MNCs started to take an interest in Fair 
Trade during the coffee crisis can be viewed as a mixed blessing. 
One the one hand, there was potential for a true change of trading practices within the 
multinationals, on the other, there was the risk that large corporations "captured" the 
initiatives that they view as dangerous and watered them down into a form that didn't 






When the declining prices of the coffee crisis tightened the noose around the necks of small 
farmers, some farmers frustrated with the slow growth of the Fair Trade market, managed to 
turn to other channels for their products. The Mexican cooperatives that were involved in the 
origins of Fair Trade labelling, entered a 10-year contract with retail giant Carrefour in 
February 2002, selling organic coffee directly at prices that exceed Fair Trade prices by far.24 
This move was criticised by some Fair Trade organisations as a risky unilateral decision to re-
enter the conventional market as suppliers to a giant multinational company. (Renard, 2003; 
Moore, 2004) 
This example of a retailer getting on the Fair Trade bandwagon is not an isolated anomaly, 
instead it was a strategy that was increasing in popularity during the coffee crisis among 
established actors in the food business. 
According to Renard (2003) there were two main ways for these actors to counteract the 
impact of Fair Trade. They could either launch a campaign meant to confuse consumers 
through the introduction of parallel labels based on weaker criteria or gain control of this 
niche market by creating their own Fair Trade products.  An example of the first strategy was 
the attempt of multinational coffee roaster Douwe Egberts to stop the advance of Fair Trade 
coffee and improve its own image during the early years of the Max Havelaar initiative. The 
company carried out several advertising campaigns including a campaign called 
"Boerenkoffie" (peasant coffee), in which Douwe Egberts announced the creation of a 
foundation that allowed direct contact with small farmers. As Max Havelaar forcefully made 
clear in their countercampaign, the multinational only paid conventional market prices to their 
producers. (Renard, 2003; Renard, 2001) In April 2000, Starbucks yielded to the pressure of 
ethical trade activists threatening to organize a campaign against them, and announced that 
they would buy a part of their coffee through Fair Trade channels. (Renard, 2003; Renard, 
2001) 
Renard (2003) sees both opportunities and threats in the ascension of multinationals in the 
Fair Trade field. The opportunity is the greater market share that can be captured if large 
multinational actors are involved. However, if the trust that consumers have in the Fair Trade 
label is eroded through abuse or dilution by multinationals then this conventionalizing 
process can be counterproductive to the aims of Fair Trade. 
 
 
24 The price given is 150 USD per quintal, the equivalent of ca. 3.30 $/lb., almost three times the Fair Trade 




The inclusion of multinational companies with their idiosyncratic ways of operating into the 
FT value chain can pose problems especially when and if the commitment to Fair Trade is 
weak. There are examples of MNCs (e.g. Starbucks) who, during the coffee crisis, started 
carrying Fair Trade goods in their product range, after being under threat by ethical trade 
activists. The possibility of image-laundering was a real one, as the goodwill that 
accompanies the Fair Trade label could be substantial, even if Fair Trade practices would 
remain at a minimal level. (Nigh, 2002; Moore, 2004) Thus, according to some observers 
(Raynolds et al., 2003; Moore, 2004)  there was a real danger that corporations would have 
tried to “hijack” parts of the alternative trade movement, and turn ethical trading into just a 
goodwill generating brand among other brands, while losing sight of its non-profit goals. 
However, there are some positive stories as well from the viewpoint of the producing 
organisations, as it is not only multinationals that have been able to enter the Fair Trade 
market, as some Fair Trade producers have been able to enter the market directly, without 
middlemen. For example, the Mexican cooperative La Selva opened eighteen coffee shops in 
Mexico, U.S.A, Spain and France at the turn of the century, and many cooperatives formed 
direct trading and marketing links with multinational retailers such as Carrefour and 
Starbucks as well as smaller-scale roasters like Van Weely and Royal Coffee. (Milford, 2004; 
Gonzales, 2002) 
 
9.5. Distribution of income  
 
The Starbucks example is a good introduction to the questions surrounding the distribution of 
income at various levels of the Fair Trade value chain. FLO has focused solely on the effects 
at the beginning of the value chain, i.e. the producers, whereas the ‘fairness’ at the retail end 
is not regulated and scrutinised in the same manner. Thus there is a possibility that the Fair 
Trade network legitimised those actors that were a target for criticism in the first place, such 
as multinational trading and retailing giants through the inclusion of these actors in the Fair 
Trade system, even while these giants continued to reap the lion’s share of the profits in the 
commodity trade. (Anderson and Riedl, 2004; Nigh, 2002) However, one does not necessarily 
need to demonise the multinationals, because - as the NRET points out - conventional modern 
export trade considers such practices as stable prices, guaranteed purchase and long-relations 
between buyer and supplier as best practice, even though Fair Trade activists would like to 





9.6. Limited knowledge among farmers 
 
In contrast to organic farming where farmers are in daily contact with product standards, 
production for the Fair Trade market during the coffee crisis was an abstract and intangible 
concept for many of the participating farmers. Such aspects of Fair Trade, as certification and 
marketing were handled at the executive level in many cooperatives. Instead of seeing the 
transnational reach of Fair Trade, many farmers equated it with actions taken by their 
cooperative, without seeing the further links in the Fair Trade value chain. In some cases 
management was even found to deliberately withhold information so as to create an image 
that the improved revenue was connected to improvements in the cooperative in itself rather 
than being a premium from FT markets. (Murray et al: 2003) Another reason why the image 
of FT was hazy among many producers, is that during the coffee crisis most cooperatives 
involved in FT only sold a fraction of their harvest to Fair Trade buyers and usually lumped 
together the proceeds of the sales when presenting them to the farmers. Credit issues were 
also usually handled by management, and farmers seldom knew that they were pre-financed 
by Fair Trade organisations. (Murray et al., 2003;  Pérezgrovas Garza and Cervantes Trejo, 
2002; Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010; Ruben ed., 2008)   
Sáenz-Segura and Zúñiga-Arias (2008, 133, in Ruben ed.: 2008) conclude in their Costa 
Rican case study (conducted in 2007) that "about half of the coffee producers in the FT region 
do not perceive any benefit from the certification, while a third part does not know about the 
premium." 
 
9.7. Problems of participation and commitment 
 
According to Nigh (2002) it is clear that Fair Trade had a positive impact on smallholder 
coffee organisations during the coffee crisis.  However, it was not an easy task to become a 
Fair Trade producer and in some cases organisations were excluded from participation by 
inconsistent criteria. One problematic issue was the exclusion of producer groups due to the 
assessment of third party monitors. There were cases when the monitors lacked the proper 
local knowledge and sensitivity to be able to assess producer organisations correctly (Nigh: 




organisations, having their roots in the local political situation.25  Even though Fair Trade has 
an implicit political agenda, there are no explicit rules for how to act in a case of a producer 
having different political visions than that of the Fair Trade movement, and according to 
Nigh, during the time of the coffee crisis, members of Northern Fair Trade organisations had 




Fair Trade is many things. It is a private ethical initiative in a time when governments have 
taken a back seat in regulating an ever-increasing amount of international trade. It is an 
opening to discuss the prevalent trade structures in our global capitalist world order. It is 
concrete products, bananas, footballs, coffee and much more, produced by less franchised 
individuals around the world. In this section I will begin by highlighting some economic 
aspects of Fair Trade, continued by looking at Fair Trade in the Global North, followed by an 
analysis of the future of FT, before I finally will discuss the impact of Fair Trade coffee on 
producer groups during the coffee crisis.   
 
10.1. Economic aspects of Fair Trade 
 
10.1.1. Fair Trade as a universal model for trade 
An interesting and as far as I know, not discussed question, is the question of the viability of 
Fair Trade coffee trading on a much larger scale, i.e. would it be possible to expand the Fair 
Trade market indefinitely and what would the consequences be? 
One can ask whether it would be possible to extend Fair Trade practices to all producers of a 
certain good, perhaps all commodities, or even all goods. If one disregards the organisational 
and political consequences, i.e. the ‘intangibles’ of Fair Trade, the following picture emerges. 
Extending Fair Trade practices to encompass all producers of a given good implies that the 
 
25 Unión Majomut based in Chiapas, Mexico was accused in an anonymous e-mail in 1999 of being involved in 
paramilitary activities. The letter demanded the expulsion of the organisation from the Fair Trade system.  





terms of trade for this good is enhanced in comparison to other goods, because of the price 
floor and the social premium. Thus, producers of other goods subsidy the producers of the 
“Fair Trade” good, as they now can buy less of the “Fair Trade” good than before. If prices of 
a certain good are fixed altogether, the market mechanism is circumvented and instead there 
is price fixing on the behalf of the “Fair Trade” producers, leading to a cartel-like system. If 
all producers of a certain good do not partake in the Fair Trade system, then there is both an 
open market for the good in question and a “closed” market with fixed prices. If the Fair 
Trade system would be extended to all commodities, then there would be a relative price 
increase for commodities and a relative price decrease for all other goods. Again, this implies 
a form of cartelization distorting the price mechanism. These artificially maintained prices 
would possibly lead to less demand for the commodity in question and perhaps create a black 
market for the commodity.26 In the extreme case of all goods and services being part of a 
system with fixed prices, one could already speak of an entirely planned economy. 
One could argue that potential price fixing and the accompanying cartelization of many or all 
commodities would not be a negative course of action, as supposedly this would increase the 
revenues of (usually economically vulnerable) commodity producers. Still, there are many 
aspects that speak against cartels; policing and monitoring the cartels is both difficult and 
expensive, and questions of product quotas, correct pricing, etc., are also difficult to solve, 
something which became evident in the maintenance and ultimate collapse of the 
International Coffee Agreement. 
One the one hand, the attempt to stabilise the market at a certain price level proved 
problematic in the ICA. On the other, the existing free market system driven by international 
traders has not proven to be significantly better (many observers would argue that it was - and 
is - actually much worse) for small producers, something that was made evident by the coffee 
crisis. Cartelization has functioned to some extent (for the producing countries) in for 
example the case of the oil, leading to increased revenues and a strong bargaining position in 
the world economy. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind the unique characteristics that oil 
possesses, and the success of OPEC can probably not be translated into similar results for less 
vital commodities. Agricultural products have very different entry barriers than the extraction 
of oil; all countries with access to the right conditions for growing a certain product can start 
producing (Vietnam’s rapid rise in coffee production is a case in point.). Moreover, most 
agricultural products are not so vital for the world economy as oil has been. The possibilities 
 




to substitute agricultural products for one another are large in many cases. If this is the case 
for coffee as well, is a question that remains outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
10.1.2. Macro analysis and the counterfactual 
 
One aspect of Fair Trade that is missing from a micro analysis is the global counterfactual, i.e. 
what happens to small holder coffee producers (or presumptive entrants into the coffee 
market) in e.g. Vietnam, when Fair Trade coffee is bought. Is the transfer of Fair Trade 
premiums enough to offset the loss of welfare in other regions where coffee is grown (or is 
waiting to be grown by even poorer families - but will not be grown) because the money that 
they could make is captured by current FT growers? The answer to this question depends on 
if FT purchases function as a direct substitute for other (coffee) purchases, i.e. does fair trade 
coffee increase the size of the coffee market "pie", or does it just slice it into new 
configurations? This is another question that warrants further research, if one wants to get a 
clearer picture of the macrolevel repercussions of the Fair Trade network. 
 
 
10.1.3. Fair Trade and neoclassical economic theory 
 
One problem with a simplistic use of standard neoclassical economic theory is that it in its 
purest abstract form is both atemporal27 and immaterial. Thus, the adjustment costs of farmers 
to retrain themselves and/or switch to other crops are not included in the (at least) most 
simplistic models used in standard economic theory. An example of the actual materiality and 
temporality of the real world is that it takes three to four years for a coffee tree to mature, 
after which it produces beans for approximately twenty to thirty years. (Milford: 2004) 
It seems evident that it will be difficult for a small farmer to adjust his or her production 
levels according to rapidly fluctuating coffee prices (perhaps exacerbated by speculative 
trading). However, this material relation between product(ion) and the physical world is not 
something that is emphasized in standard economic theory, where the focus lies on analysing 
a mode of production more suited to a factory setting where capital, labor and various inputs 
are more readily substituted for each other. 
 





10.1.4. The floor price and unlimited expansion 
 
Hypothetically, the floor price of Fair Trade coffee should increase supply inelasticity, as 
producers are guaranteed at least a certain price for their coffee beans, and thus have less 
incentive to root up their existing coffee plants and replace them with e.g. crops that are 
compatible for subsistence farming.                                                                                                 
As coffee plants take a lot of time and quite some effort to get to a point where they yield 
harvests, the floor price that Fair Trade guarantees enables a more long-term approach to 
coffee farming. Nevertheless if one would expand the Fair Trade floor price to all coffee 
production, this would create perverse incentives for farmers to increase their production ad 
infinitum and ad perpetuum, thus creating a de facto situation of the rigid prices of a planned 
economy. Thus, the production and sales of Fair Trade coffee in its current form can not be 
expanded without limits without substantial accompanying problems, even if the market for 
such coffee existed. 
 
10.1.5. The "fair price" concept 
 
Moore (2004) lists a number of penetrating questions that have to answered, unless Fair Trade 
is to be reduced to a development fad characterised more by a “launch, lunch, and a logo”  
(Blowfield: 1999, 761) rather than being a serious development effort. Questions such as: 
 
What is a “fair” price for the exports of developing countries? Does paying a higher price make it fair? Would a 
straight donation, rather than paying a higher price, be more efficient? Is Fair Trade always better than Free 
Trade and protectionism or does it depend upon conditions? Is the reliance on the largesse of the developed 
world sustainable through periods of economic uncertainty? Does the higher price lead to over-supply and delay 
a move to the development by producer organisations of higher value added products? Does it lead to 
dependency on the part of the producers? Does it disadvantage those producers who do not engage in Fair Trade 
in comparison to those which do? (Moore: 2004, 5) 
 
I will try to answer some of these questions in the following. Moore's felt necessity to define 
a "fair" price is in my opinion relevant and fruitful, as it is an elusive concept that is easy to 




When the GDP per capita of many developing countries is only a tenth or even a hundredth of 
the richest countries, the issue of fair pricing might seem quite clear at a cursory glance, 
namely that the North could afford higher prices on its commodities, while restrictive trade 
barriers have had a long history of hindering developing country exports of especially 
manufactured goods. (Mshomba: 2000)  
However, as attempts such as commodity control schemes have shown, this imbalance is hard 
to rectify and it makes too many assumptions and generalisations, i.e. what about the 
producers of different goods or services within developing countries, or trade between 
developing countries? At what level does the "fair price" lie then? When one looks to 
conventional neoclassical economic theory, the concept of "fair price" would probably be 
defined as the clearing price in perfect market conditions. I, however, will argue that many 
commodity markets, including markets for food products are characterised by market 
imperfection. 
The notion that Fair Trade organisations can define a “fair price” for a certain product - and 
thus the underlying cost of capital and innovation that forms the production process- is in my 
mind a case of hubris. One approach when trying to open up the concept of fair pricing, is to 
include those externalities that are not included in the market price. Such externalities are for 
example of environmental or social nature, i.e. costs that are borne by society or the 
environment, but that are caused by the actions of private enterprises. It seems evident that 
this inclusion of social and environmental externalities into the "fair price" concept is not a 
precise or closed process; instead it is an imperfect and approximating process, as the range 
and depth of productional externalities can be very varying and sometimes quite intangible. 
 
10.1.6. Fair price and market power 
 
As this thesis hopefully has shown, is that one of the reasons why small farmers receive so 
little of the retail value of their products is the power imbalances in the supply chain. 
For example, in 2001, during the low point of the coffee crisis, food and beverage giant 
Nestlé reported a record profit of €4.5 billion. (Nestle: 2002) 
If I continue with the unpacking of Moore’s (2004) questions in the previous section, then the 
answers for Moore's first two questions are quite clear in my opinion; a higher than current 
price for the small producers of most commodities are important steps towards fairer pricing. 
However, trade is not necessarily made fair by paying a higher price at the retail end; instead 




the case of coffee being the monopolies/monopsonies of international traders and roasters and 
the increase of competition in local markets of especially middlemen. Naturally, one has to 
keep questions of efficiency as well as equity in mind. It is not productive to artificially 
maintain high price levels in saturated markets, thus creating incentives for producers to 
increase production when supply is already too high, something which is a real problem for 
Fair Trade. To rectify this problem perhaps increased information is one possible solution. 
However, to teach the small farmers of the world the intricacies of e.g. commodity future 
markets can be a difficult task. 
Another problem are the distributional aspects within Fair Trade, as not all producer 
applicants can join because of the limited market. The choices seem to fall on those producer 
groups who have the requisite managerial and business skills to survive in a competitive 
environment, and not the ones who are in most need of help. However, even though Fair 
Trade is imperfect so are - I would argue - other forms of development interventions. 
  
10.2. Fair Trade in the North 
 
The origins of Fair Trade is in the Global North. Fair Trade products are almost exclusively 
consumed in the North by Northern consumers. It is governed and audited by northern 
organisations employing many people from the North. 
As Fair Trade was developed in the North, in rich developed countries, with the explicit aim 
to help people in poor developing countries, there remains and inherent tension that is to 
some extent is inevitable if development interventions from the north to the south are to be 
accepted or encouraged at all. Nevertheless, most FT producers in the Global South are not 
vested in the ethics of their process of production, but view it more as a matter of product 
differentiation such as organic production. (Ruben ed.: 2008) The cynical counterfactual 
question would indeed be, would FT producers engage in unethical production activities, if 
the rewards were substantially higher? To acknowledge the fact that the cultivation of plants 
that form the basis of illicit drugs is widespread around the world, seems like a good 
beginning when trying to answer this question.                                                                                                                   
A further proof of the lopsidedness of Fair Trade is that it still maintains clear-cut remains of 
previous imperial and core-periphery divisions of labour, with sales of Fair Trade products 




a continent28 counted for less than 0.3% of total Fairtrade sales, Asia for 1.1% and Latin 
America (= Brazil) for less than 0.01%. (Lernoud and Willer: 2017) 
Another example of the lopsidedness is that during the height of the coffee crisis more than 
ten million euros was spent every year by FT organisations on education, public relations and 
marketing. (EFTA: 2001) Critical observers could contrast this with the some 80 million € 
that small growers received in FT premiums in 2004 (FLO: 2005a). Thus, a substantial 
amount that could perhaps given to growers as premium premium was spent on PR activities 
in the North by FT organisations, even though one has to acknowledge that perhaps it was 
money well spent as an investment to increase future FT sales. 
 
10.2.1 Multinationals and public institutions 
 
To what extent the actual or the narrated version of the coffee crisis managed to sway the 
NGOs to action, and big multinationals (such as Starbucks) to incorporate FT products into 
their assortment is an interesting question, that warrants further research.  But it is probably 
not a coincidence that after many years of mounting pressure, many international giants in the 
coffee trade changed stance - at least on the surface - towards Fair Trade. Thus economically, 
business was almost as usual, whereas when looking at the public relations side of things, the 
multinationals could maintain that they had sided with "Fair Trade". 
Another target of Fair Trade campaigning was public institutions. This strategy proved 
especially successful, as many political, religious and educational institutions across Europe 
started serving Fair Trade coffee as an alternative to conventional coffee during the years of 
the coffee crisis, including all of the European Union institutions, and various national, 
regional and municipal institutions in e.g. Germany, The United Kingdom, and The 
Netherlands. (Fridell: 2004) 
Using Fair Trade as window dressing to patch up a tarnished image is a phenomenon that 
according to Fridell (2004) is commonplace. Fridell’s analysis is that Fair Trade at the turn of 
the century was part of a more general transformation in the international trade and 
development regime, involving the decline of both state intervention and market regulation. 
The focus of developmental work shifted from being a virtual monopoly of state-led agents to 
becoming more reliant on NGOs and the private sector.  
 




The use of Fair Trade as ethical window dressing remains a potential possibility for MNCs. 
Such coffee giants as Procter & Gamble and Sara Lee that successfully lobbied the US 
government to abandon the price control measures of the International Coffee Agreement in 
1989 and subsequently reapt the profits of this event, started to support Fair Trade coffee 
during the coffee crisis. (Fridell: 2004) 
Even the World Bank started to show interest in Fair Trade towards the end of the coffee 
crisis, as it was a part of "private (market driven) standards that encourage employers to adopt 
desirable labour practices." (World Bank quoted in Fridell: 2004, 154) During the later years 
of the coffee crisis World Bank staff and Fair Trade advocates met many times, and the World 
Bank started to promote Fair Trade on its website and began serving Fair Trade coffee at its 
Washington DC based headquarters. (Fridell: 2004) 
Thus, one of the actors that (arguably) supported the destruction of many of the state-led 
(however flawed) initiatives supporting the livelihoods of small coffee farmers, (such as the 
ICA) started to serve one response to this destruction in its air-conditioned board rooms. 
 
The irony here is quite rich, namely that public institutions jumped aboard the Fair Trade 
bandwagon, as the FT movement is mainly consumer-driven and thus a non-governmental 
development initiative. The ascendancy of Fair Trade and the supposed need for such a 
movement can be said (perhaps as a slight overstatement) to be the result of inadequate 
efforts of the traditional state-led development field. Thus, one could perhaps argue that the 
public institutions have completed a full circle, by patching up their image in the support of 
peripheral development efforts (such as Fair Trade), while maintaining the status quo in the 
core field of traditional development work. 
 
10.3. Economy or Politics? - The dual nature of the Fair Trade 
movement 
 
The need for reliable deliveries of high-quality goods can be a difficult or even 
insurmountable task for many communities that would be ideal Fair Trade partners due to 
their socio-economic position. This fact highlights one of the fundamental questions of FT. 
Is Fair Trade trying to create a more functioning market, or trying to step outside the market 
system, creating something new? What are the tensions between these viewpoints, and in 




This tension is noted by a number of observers, among others Renard (2003) and Raynolds 
(2000). As the situation stands, Fair Trade seems to be a mixture of both approaches with 
some idiosyncratic add-ons that permeate the structure at different levels. 
Renard (2003) sees a clear line of demarcation in the shift from specialty stores that sell 
alternative or Fair Trade products to the incorporation of Fair Trade products into 
conventional supermarkets. Indeed going to a World Shop to buy one or two specialty 
products was probably a bigger limitation on the Fair Trade market due to the effort to go 
there than the higher prices that these products commanded. Thus according to Renard 
(2003), in the move towards the conventional, Fair Trade shifted from appealing to political 
convictions to humanitarian sentiments.  
This dual nature of Fair Trade, being both within and outside the market has been a reason to 
debate the raison d'être of Fair Trade. Renard (2003) identifies two different camps, a more 
radical camp that sees Fair Trade as a challenge to the prevalent economic system, and a more 
pragmatic one that is interested in selling Southern products at higher prices in the North.  
 
The tension between the radical and the pragmatic was already visible during the time of the 
coffee crisis, and one can say that it has exacerbated since, with various initiatives (such as 
the World Fair Trade Organisation and Fair Trade USA) either not joining FLO or seceding 
from it.29 
The radical group views Fair Trade as a stepping stone towards a New World Trading Order, 
whereas the pragmatic sees the increasing market share of Fair Trade as a desirable result in 
itself.  There is an interesting tension in the demands of the market and the ideologically and 
ethically motivated starting point of Fair Trade.   
The (at least supposedly) ethical nature of Fair Trade products, is an advantage in the 
marketplace just as design, price and quality are. Thus, profits are made out of a perceived 
notion of fairness, and Fair Trade can be seen - in a view that stresses the market approach - 
as a niche product for a specific (ethically minded) demographic group. 
Tensions arise within the Fair Trade system out of the special constraints that apply to it, such 
as the minimum price guarantee above the market price, direct dealing with producers, 
prepayment of the products, etc. One also has to remember that along the value chain of Fair 
Trade, there are also businesspeople whose main aim is to make a profit and are interested in 
the ethical linkage of Fair Trade as a vehicle for reaping profit but not as an end result per se. 
 
29 In September 2011, Fair Trade USA resigned from FLO, stating that it wanted "to double" the impact of Fair 




One could argue that the participants in the Fair Trade network who are mainly interested in 
the ethical side are the consumers of the end product and perhaps the facilitators and 
regulators, in the form of FLO and other Fair Trade organisations. Both the producers in the 
form of mainly small farmers and most retailers probably do not view ethics as a central part 
of their venture. Indeed, the possibility for Fair Trade producers to switch to the 
administratively less cumbersome conventional market might leave FLO and its partner 
organisations in a tight spot, if producers with longstanding ties that are well integrated into 
the system decide to leave it. Finding new and suitable producers is a time and resource 
consuming process, and if the rate of producers joining and leaving the Fair Trade system 
becomes too high then the whole edifice is prone to collapse. If this possible increased 
turnover among FT producer cooperatives actually took place after the coffee crisis, is a 
question that warrants further research. 
  
The radical vision is defined by its discursive character, viewing Fair Trade as an opening in 
the discussion on issues concerning trade, and the potential that trade has to improve or 
worsen the situation for the developing countries. Included in this discursive character is the 
view that Fair Trade should challenge the existing status quo of the international trading 
system, and perhaps even challenge the whole capitalist system. (Moore, 2004; Renard, 2001; 
Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010) 
This other approach tries to question the dominant capitalist "fetishized"30 mode of 
production and trade, by creating personal, close stable connections to producer over long 
periods of time, and often even paying significantly higher premiums to producers than Fair 
Trade criteria. (Lyon and Moberg ed.: 2010) 
One can already see that the FLO is firmly in the practical camp, whereas e.g. WFTO is more 
leaning towards the radical one. But one could also argue that idealism and radicalism is 





30 In the Marxian sense, where production and exchange are not viewed as relationships between people but as 




10.4. The impact on Fair Trade coffee on producer groups 
10.4.1. Distribution of benefits 
 
In my mind, it is to some extent a double-bind without a satisfactory solution that Fair Trade 
initiatives are not targeting the groups most needing economic support. This is mostly due to 
the necessity of requisite managerial and economic knowledge among producers.  As 
producers of export commodities are usually not the most disadvantaged groups in 
developing countries one can thus ask if the targeted groups are really the ones that need 
support the most. 
Another distributional aspect is that of gender. Women are much less likely to participate and 
receive income from Fair Trade schemes. The gender aspect was not a central question in the 
Fair Trade movement at the time of the coffee crisis, and the distribution of income within 
households was perhaps be even worsened by Fair Trade as male heads of households  
received additional income, whereas their spouses were in practice excluded from the FT 
network and the concomitant increased earnings, especially in Latin America. (NRET, 1999; 
Lyon and Moberg ed., 2010) 
 
10.4.2. Choosing producer groups 
 
If Fair Trade is a subsidy for vulnerable producers, then one wonders what the criteria for 
inclusion in this exclusive club with many economic benefits should be? 
The FLO has its criteria, but the implementation seems to be more haphazard than very 
organised or well-grounded. Furthermore, is Fair Trade a zero-sum game that is played at the 
level of production, where some producers gain and are able to continue their (perhaps 
inefficient) production while others continue to be even more marginalised and have to make 
cutbacks or even stop producing altogether? 
As a worst case scenario, Fair Trade becomes a somewhat arbitrary subsidy to certain 
producer groups, while leaving others even worse off because of the unfair competition and 
shift of revenues towards Fair Trade away from normal markets. 31 Moreover, as stated earlier, 
 
31 If the sum total spent on a family of products  - e.g. FT coffee and regular coffee - remains the same, and the 
Fair Trade product increases its market share, then Fair Trade producers gain and conventional producers lose. 
Nevertheless this result does not necessarily obtain in the real world, as consumers may spend more on the 




the encouragement of producing a product that is ridden with chronic oversupply (e.g. coffee 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s) seems to be a recipe for disaster. 
 
10.4.3. Fair Trade and cultural imperialism 
 
Fair trade emphasizes trade. To some extent it perpetuates the power imbalance it explicitly 
tries to rectify as it can trap producers in commodity production, when other income options 
could be more beneficial. Fair Trade can very well be seen as a form of cultural imperialism, 
in that it imposes certain standards, ideas and manners of conduct on some of the most 
vulnerable societies around the world. A case in point is the payment and usage of the social 
premium connected to Fair Trade coffee. 
Prior to the coffee crisis, the social premium of .05 USD/pound of coffee was often 
distributed among cooperative members instead of being used jointly by the community.   
During the coffee crisis, FLO pressurised producer organisations to use the premium for 
social projects (Murray et al. 2003). However, one has to bear in mind the caveat of Valkila 
(personal communication: 2006), who presents a contrary picture, maintaining that in practice 
many cooperatives were free to do as they please with the premium.   
Returning to the evidence presented by Murray et al. (2003), many projects were undertaken 
during the coffee crisis, supported by the social premium, e.g. the construction of latrines and 
fuel-efficient stoves. Thus, the existence of the social premium could perhaps be viewed as a 
success. Nevertheless, the existence of an income tied to certain criteria could also be viewed 
as a form of cultural imperialism, echoing a previous era of "white elephant" projects in the 
field of development, in the sense that northern organisations suggest an "allowed range" of 
acceptable projects or purchases not tied to local realities. 
The above-mentioned comments are not to be seen as a defence of the dismantling of 
collective resources, instead it is a reminder of the inherent and sometimes invisible power 
relations in perhaps all acts of good will. To some extent the whole edifice of Fair Trade 
entails aspects of cultural imperialism, as it focuses on a number of issues that are less 
emphasised in many producer societies, such as gender issues. Even though one usually 
connotes cultural imperialism with something negative it is seems to be inherent in all forms 
of development work, and as such it is perhaps a necessary component for any "traditional", 






Fair Trade epitomises the evolution of the field of development in the 21st century. It is a 
development initiative that fuses the private with the public and the global with the local. 
 
Even though Fair Trade was still an edifice being built at the time of the coffee crisis, in 
1999-2004 it was already a large transnational endeavour involving over five hundred 
producer organisations, representing over one million farmers and workers in over fifty 
different countries. With total sales of 83032 million € in 2004 (FLO:2005a), and subsequent 
rapid growth, Fair Trade had already taken its first tentative steps into the mainstream of 
society, with many of the trappings that accompany such a transformation. Thus, already 
during the coffee crisis it is probably fair to say that the Fair Trade movement had started to 
expand to such a scale that many interests besides the purely ethical ones wanted to maintain 
and increase the level of success already gained. 
 
The dismal development of the coffee market during the coffee crisis led to a situation where 
the price that producers received for their Fair Trade coffee was substantially higher than they 
received for their conventional coffee. This made Fair Trade coffee very attractive for 
producers, thus increasing the number of producers interested in the scheme. The strong 
monetary incentives to sell coffee in the Fair Trade market capped the amount of coffee that 
any one producer organisation could sell through the Fair Trade system. However, as coffee 
prices again started to rise from their rock-bottom levels, the Fair Trade market with its 
somewhat cumbersome rules and regulations began to look as a less and less attractive option. 
How rising prices affected the interest of Fair Trade farmers to remain in the Fair Trade 
network is a crucial question that to some extent determines the raison d'être of the Fair Trade 
movement, i.e. is Fair Trade a stopgap measure in times of crisis, or are producers willing to 
go the extra mile (through more work, more bureaucracy) to ensure that Fair Trade can 
maintain its lofty trajectory in the marketplace. As alluded to earlier, this is a question that 
warrants further research.  
 




I will now answer the four questions posed in the introduction, leaving the first and foremost 
question to be answered last.33 
Fair Trade is an initiative within the sphere of ethical trade, stemming from the insight that 
something is wrong with conventional trading structures. Fair Trade is an alternative trading 
system, functioning both as an example how trade can be conducted and as a vehicle for 
concrete economical help to vulnerable producing communities around the world. Fair Trade 
has splintered into two main branches, already visible during the coffee crisis, namely that of 
a quickly expanding ethical (niche) market, under the aegis of the labelling organization FLO, 
and another branch trying to create “even fairer” trade than the Fair Trade of FLO, where the 
importer or retailer try to maintain close personal relationships with producers – exemplified 
by e.g. WFTO.  
The main reason for the coffee crisis was oversupply, due to the ascendancy of new coffee 
producing nations after the collapse of the ICA (especially Vietnam), in tandem with record 
harvests in Brazil. These record harvests were, on the one hand, due to high coffee prices in 
the early and mid-1990s incentivizing growers to increase production, and on the other, due to 
the fact that no major weather shocks affected Brazil in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
During the coffee crisis, the conventional coffee market was dominated by a few traders and 
even fewer roasters. This market power allowed them to capture the benefits of falling coffee 
prices and to turn the ever-cheapening raw material for their own products into increasing 
profits, at least in the case of Nestlé, something that is exemplified by the Nestlé-Sainsbury 
vs. Prodecoop-Cafédirect value chain analysis, and the fact that Nestlé made record profits in 
the midst of the coffee crisis. 
The coffee crisis was exactly such an event that FT was designed to avert or at least 
ameliorate. When looking at the case studies from the various cooperatives during the crisis, 
one can say that at the local level at least, Fair Trade had a lot of impact in producing 
communities, especially in the ones where a large part of the harvest was sold through Fair 
Trade channels. More than half a million coffee farmers enjoyed the (limited) security that 
belonging to the Fair Trade network provided, something that could mean the difference 
between malnutrition (or even starvation) and an adequate food intake - especially at the 
height of the crisis in 2001-2002.  
 
33 What was the impact of Fair Trade coffee during the coffee crisis? What is Fair Trade? What factors led to the 





To measure the impact of Fair Trade coffee during the coffee crisis is both easy and hard at 
the same time. Following Jaffee (2008, in Ruben ed.) one could maintain that the easy part is 
to say that for many producing communities, Fair Trade during the coffee crisis was a 
necessary measure, but in many cases not a sufficient one. Nevertheless, looking at the macro 
level, with FT consisting of less than 1% of total coffee sales in 2004 (FLO, 2005a; Osorio, 
2004), it is clear by looking at scale alone that Fair Trade coffee at the time of the crisis was 
just a small drop in an ocean of conventional trade. 
The hard part is to pinpoint exactly what impact Fair Trade had due to the many different 
forces affecting the producer groups. Even though some of the case studies (Ruben ed.: 2008) 
have used non-FT coffee growers as control groups in their studies, to ascribe causality to 
certain mechanisms and isolating them from other factors remains a problem. 
One effect of Fair Trade coffee that is especially difficult to evaluate, is how the debate on 
trading structures, to some extent instigated by Fair Trade, changed the lives of small farmers 
in the South. The success of the debate on how to change international trade structures into 
more equitable ones for Southern producers, is hard to analyse due to the difficulty of 
ascribing causality to various factors, and following the presumptive causal link between 
debate, opinion and action. Nevertheless, debate created opinion that perhaps led to changes 
in policies and legislation, thus trickling down all the way to the grassroot level of small 
farmers.  
The pressure that was applied by Fair Trade campaigners on large companies resulted in some 
changed policies during the time of the coffee crisis, such as the decision by Starbucks to start 
including Fair Trade goods in their product range. Some might argue that these changes were 
superficial PR stunts, however, in my opinion there was - and is - a potential for an 
incrementally changing market that better suits small farmers, if the pressure on 
multinationals is kept up. The impact that Fair Trade campaigning has had on the policies of 
large companies and on the business climate in which international trade is conducted could 
perhaps be viewed as the biggest - though indirect - impact that Fair Trade has had, affecting 
not only Fair Trade farmers, but all farmers, everywhere. One has to bear in mind however, as 
stated earlier, that the causal chains behind this impact is difficult to measure in any 
meaningful way. 
 
The main problems that Fair Trade tried to rectify during the coffee crisis, were issues of 
imperfect competition and unequal power relations that small producers of mainly food 




handful of leading firms controlled the crucial stages of the value chain, be it trading, 
processing or some other stage. 
The coffee value chain during the coffee crisis is a good example of such strong dominance 
(governance in Gereffi's terms) by a few actors. Thus, I think that Fair Trade at best remained 
a marginal fix, a band-aid on a gaping wound of unequal international trade. Fair Trade did at 
best bring some alleviation for a small part of the millions of farmers that remained at the 
bottom rung of international commodity markets. This imbalance in power and the resulting 
terms of trade can and must be remedied through other measures. 
Turning to the micro level, it becomes clear that here the picture is slightly less opaque, and 
that Fair Trade coffee actually managed to provide higher incomes for producers involved in 
the FT network than the conventional one. Still one has to bear in mind that one more dollar 
for a Fair Trade farmer was perhaps one dollar less for another farmer, elsewhere. 
Keeping this caveat in mind, the case studies included in this thesis conclude that Fair Trade 
coffee was mostly a positive factor at the local level, especially when viewed in economic 
terms. Nevertheless, issues such as linkages to the community at large, gender issues and the 
difficulty to disentangle the effect of just Fair Trade coffee in co-operatives that use many 
type of markets as outlets for their goods, are somewhat difficult to resolve. 
When I started writing my thesis in the spring of 2006, it seemed to me from the scarce 
material available at the time, that the people studying the Fair Trade phenomenon very well 
could be divided into two main camps. The first camp consisted of those who were critical 
towards Fair Trade. In my limited sample, these criticisms generally sprung from researchers 
with a background in economics, who pointed out the inefficiencies and the limited scale of 
Fair Trade. The second camp seemed to consist of researchers with a background in the social 
sciences or the humanities, and generally had a more positive attitude towards Fair Trade. The 
majority of the studies that I included in this thesis have been written by people that I would 
define as belonging to the second camp, with a more positive view on Fair Trade, thus 
perhaps skewing my analysis towards a viewpoint more in favour of Fair Trade. The reason 
why a smaller amount of studies critical of Fair Trade have been included in my thesis is the 
reason that there were only a handful of them at the time when I started writing this thesis, 
such as Zehner (2002) and Lindsey (2004). Moreover, the overtly critical studies have 
remained a minority of all studies written up until the present day, at least in the material that 
I have come across. As only a minority of studies have had an explicitly critical stance, they 
are also a minority in my thesis. Furthermore, as the research concerning Fair Trade has 
matured, the most partisan views have been tempered by more rigorous and analytic, and thus 





When looking at the arguments that stem from the critical camp, we see that one of the 
arguments they make is that the Fair Trade premium is an inefficiently transferred subsidy to 
small coffee farmers. After reviewing the existing data, I concur with this opinion. 
Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that other ways of resource transfers from the rich 
North to the poor South are all linked with similar problems also facing Fair Trade.   
For instance, the Nestlé-Sainsbury vs. Prodecoop-Cafédirect case study (Mendoza and 
Bastiansen: 2003) indicates that the premium paid by the consumer when purchasing a pound 
of Fair Trade coffee dwindles down to a fifth, when it reaches the level of the producer, with 
Valkila et al. (2010) presenting somewhat similar figures. It could be argued, that small 
farmers would be better off if the Fair Trade consumer would write a check for the same 
amount as the premium she pays in the supermarket. In my opinion this conclusion disregards 
many of the problematic aspects surrounding direct monetary transfers to small farmers, such 
as the potential for corruption and dependency. Nevertheless, if the wastage of the transfer 
reaches four-fifths as in the Nestlé-Sainsbury case, it seems clear that a more efficient 
resource transfer method could indeed be conceived. 
 
There are many roads that one can follow when trying to pinpoint the impact of Fair Trade 
coffee during the coffee crisis. One can look at the economic impacts in producing 
communities. One can choose to focus on psychological factors such as a newfound sense of 
pride and self-esteem that a more equal trading regime is nurturing. One can look at how 
organisational changes that Fair Trade has fostered was changing the makeup of how people 
interacted and communicated, and how power structures and social strata changed through the 
introduction of new modes of practice. One can look at families or individuals to see if the 
awareness of Fair Trade penetrated into the household atoms or if it remained outside the door 
of the concrete and symbolic dwellings of man, in areas where even the smallest increase of 
income was a necessity rather than a luxury. It is because of the totality of the phenomenon - 
its many interlinked facets - that any final conclusion on the impact of Fair Trade coffee 
during the coffee crisis is hard to make. As one answers one question, two new ones emerge 
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Fairtrade, an Alternative for Small Farmers and Workers 
Fairtrade is an initiative for small farmers and wage workers in the South, who have been restrained in their 
economical and / or social development by the conditions of trade (= ‘disadvantaged’). If fair access to markets 
under better conditions of trade can help to overcome the restraints of development, they can join Fairtrade. 
 
Small farmers can join Fairtrade if they have formed organisations (in co-operatives, associations or other 
organisational forms1) which are able to contribute to the social and economic development of their members 
and their communities and are democratically controlled by their members. Organisations can be certified by 
FLO if they comply with the requirements in this document. 
 
Workers can participate in Fairtrade if they are organised, normally in unions, and if the company they work for 
is prepared to promote workers’ development and to pass on to the workers the additional revenues generated by 
Fairtrade. Such companies working with hired labour (farms, plantations, etc.), can be certified if they comply 
with the requirements in this document. 
 
In setting its Standards FLO follows certain internationally recognised standards and conventions, especially 
those of the ILO (International Labour Organisation), as these form the basic labour rights most widely accepted 
throughout the world. In this document each Standard is formulated in general terms, and, where applicable, 
reference is made to external standards which FLO follows. 
 
The Standard is then followed by the requirements against which producers will actually be 
inspected. The requirements are divided into: 
 
• minimum requirements, which all producer organisations must meet from the moment they 
join Fairtrade, or within a specified period; and 
 
• progress requirements, on which producer organisations must show permanent improvement. 
A report on the achievement of progress requirements should be made each year. 
Minimum in this sense is meant to ensure that: 
 
1. Fairtrade benefits reach the small farmers and/or workers. 
2. The small farmers' organisation and/or the workers has/have potential for development. 






The degree of progress, which FLO requires from each producer organisation, depends on the level of economic 
benefits it receives from Fairtrade and on its specific context. 
FLO also requires that producer organisations always abide by national legislation. Furthermore, 
national legislation prevails if it sets higher standards on particular issues than FLO. 
 
 
1 Social Development 
 
1.1 Fairtrade adds Development Potential 
Fairtrade should make a difference in development for certified producers. 
 
1.1.1 Minimum Requirement 
1.1.1.1 The producer organisation can demonstrate that Fairtrade revenues will promote social and economical 
development of small farmers. 
 
1.1.2 Progress Requirement 
1.1.2.1 A monitored plan should be developed under which the benefits of Fairtrade (including the Premium) are 
shared based on a democratic decision taken by the beneficiaries. 
 
 
1.2 Members are Small Producers 
By small producers are understood those that are not structurally dependent on permanent 
hired labour, managing their farm mainly with their own and their family's labour-force. 
 
1.2.1 Minimum Requirement 
1.2.1.1 The majority of the members of the organisation are small producers. 
1.2.1.2 Of every Fairtrade-certified product sold by the organisation, more than 50% of the volume must be 
produced by small producers. 
 
1.2.2 Progress Requirement 
1.2.2.1 Where a minority of small producers from within a small producer organisation is producing a particular 
Fairtrade-product, special attention needs to be given to ensure that they will always receive a cost-covering 
price for their product from the small producers' organisation. 
The small producer organisation will establish an adequate system for this respectively. 
 
 
1.3 Democracy, Participation and Transparency 
The organisation must be an instrument for the social and economical development of the members, 
and in particular the benefits of Fairtrade must come to the members. The organisation must therefore 
have a democratic structure and transparent administration, which enables an effective control by the 
members and its Board over the management, including the decisions about how the benefits are 





1.3.1 Minimum requirements 
1.3.1.1 An organisational structure is in place which enables control by the members. There is a 
General Assembly with voting rights for all members as the supreme decision taking body 
and an elected Board. The staff answers through the Board to the General Assembly. 
1.3.1.2 The organisation holds a General Assembly at least once a year. 
1.3.1.3 The annual report and accounts are presented to and approved by the General Assembly. 
1.3.1.4 Administration is in place. 
 
1.3.2 Progress requirements 
1.3.2.1 The organisation works towards transparent planning of the business. Organisations are 
encouraged to make annual business plans, cash flow predictions and longer term strategic 
plans. Such plans will be approved by the General Assembly. 
1.3.2.2 The participation of members in the organisation's administration and internal control is 
promoted through training and education - and improves as a result. 
1.3.2.3 The organisation establishes or improves internal mechanisms of members’ control over the 
administration, such as a control committee with rights to review the administration, external 
audit, etc. 
1.3.2.4 Increasingly, the organisation’s policies are discussed in member meetings. Management 
actively encourages members’ participation in meetings. 
1.3.2.5 There is improvement of the flow of information from board to members about the business and the 
organisation’s policies. 
1.3.2.6 Measures will be taken to improve the members’ commitment to the organization. 
 
1.4 Non-Discrimination 
FLO follows ILO Convention 111 on ending discrimination of workers. The Convention rejects “any 
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation” (art. 1). As far as applicable, FLO extends 
these principles to members of organisations. 
 
1.4.1 Minimum requirements 
1.4.1.1 If the organisation restricts new membership, the restriction may not contribute to the 
discrimination of particular social groups. 
 
1.4.2 Progress requirements 
1.4.2.1 Programs related to disadvantaged/minority groups within the organisation are in place to 
improve the position of those groups in the organisation, particularly with respect to 
recruitment, staff and committee membership. 
 
 




2.1 Fairtrade Premium 
The organisation has the commitment and capacity to administer the Fairtrade Premium in a way 
which is transparent for beneficiaries and FLO. Decisions on the use of the Premium are taken 
democratically by the members. 
 
2.1.1 Minimum requirements 
2.1.1.1 The organisation administrates and manages the Premium transparently and uses it in line 
with the requirements outlined in these Standards. 
2.1.1.2 The use of the Fairtrade Premium is decided by the General Assembly and properly 
documented 
 
2.1.2 Progress requirements 
2.1.2.1 As soon as Premium is available, there is a yearly Premium plan and budget, preferably these are part of 
a general work plan and budget of the organisation. 
 
2.2 Export Ability 
The producers must have access to the logistical, administrative and technical means to bring a quality 
product to the market. 
 
2.2.1 Minimum requirements 
2.2.1.1 Logistics and communication equipment are in place. 
2.2.1.2 The producer organisation proves that it meets current export quality standards, preferably through 
previously exported products which were accepted by importers. 
2.2.1.3 Demand for the producers’ Fairtrade product exists. 
2.2.1.4 The organisation has experience in the commercialisation of a product as an organisation. 
 
2.2.2 Progress requirements 
2.2.2.1 The producer organisation increases efficiency in their exporting operations as well as in 
other operations and this way maximises the return to the members. 
 
2.3 Economic Strengthening of the Organisation 
 
2.3.1 Progress requirements 
2.3.1.1 Members will gradually take on more responsibility over the whole export process. 
2.3.1.2 The organisation will work towards the strengthening of its business related operations. This could for 
example be through the building up of working capital, implementation of quality 
control, training/education and risk management systems, etc. 
 
 
3 Environmental Development 
 




Producers are expected to protect the natural environment and to make environment protection a part 
of farm management. 
Producers will implement a system of Integrated Crop Management (ICM), with the aim of establishing 
a balance between environment protection and business results, through the permanent monitoring of 
economic and environmental parameters, on the basis of which an integrated cultivation and 
protection plan is devised and permanently adapted. FLO encourages producers to work towards 
organic certification. 
ICM minimises the use of fertilisers and pesticides, and partially and gradually replaces them with organic 
fertilisers and biological disease control. 
 
3.1.1 Minimum requirements 
3.1.1.1 The producers live up to national and international legislation regarding the use of pesticides, handling 
pesticides (storing, filling, cleaning, administration, etc.), the protection of natural waters, virgin forest and other 
ecosystems of high ecological value, erosion and waste 
management. 
3.1.1.2 Pesticides in WHO class 1 a+b, pesticides in the Pesticide Action Network’s “dirty dozen” list and 
pesticides in FAO/UNEP's Prior Informed Consent Procedure list (respecting updates) cannot be used. 
 
3.1.2 Progress requirements 




4 Standards on Labour Conditions 
FLO regards the ILO Conventions as the authority on working conditions, and expects all registered 
producers to meet the requirements as far as possible. Where a significant number of workers are 
employed by a small farmer organisation, there are specific standards to meet. Where a smaller 
number are employed and where workers are casually hired by farmers themselves, the organisations 
should take steps to improve working conditions and to ensure that such workers share the benefits of 
Fairtrade. This should be part of the development plan and be reported to FLO. 
The term “workers” refers to all those employed, including casual, seasonal and permanent workers. 
In cases where a plantation or factory is a member of the producer organisation certified by FLO, the 
generic standards for hired labour apply fully and the plantation or factory will need to go through a 
separate inspection process. 
 
Applicable to all producer organisations: 
4.1 Forced Labour and Child Labour 
FLO follows ILO Conventions 29, 105, 138 and 182 on child labour and forced labour. Forced or 
bonded labour must not occur. Bonded labour can be the result of forms of indebtedness of workers to 
the company or middlemen. Children may only work if their education is not jeopardised. If children 





4.1.1 Minimum requirements 
4.1.1.1 Forced labour, including bonded or involuntary prison labour, does not occur. 
4.1.1.2 Children are not employed (contracted) below the age of 15. 
4.1.1.3 Working does not jeopardise schooling or the social, moral or physical development of the young person. 
4.1.1.4 The minimum age of admission to any type of work which by its nature or the circumstances under 
which it is carried out, is likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young people, shall not be less than 
18 years. 
4.1.1.5 Employment is not conditioned by employment of the spouse. Spouses have the right to offfarm 
employment. 
 
Applicable to Producer organisations in which a significant number of workers are employed: 
4.2 Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining 
FLO follows ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining. Workers 
and employers shall have the right to establish and to join organisations of their own choosing, and to 
draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives and to formulate their programmes. 
Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their 
employment. 
 
4.2.1 Minimum requirements 
4.2.1.1 The organisation recognises in writing the right of all employees to join an independent trade union, free 
of interference of the employer, the right to establish and join federations, and the right to collective bargaining. 
4.2.1.2 The organisation allows trade union organisers to meet all the workers, and allows workers to hold 
meetings and organise themselves without the interference of the management. 
4.2.1.3 The organisation does not discriminate against workers on the basis of union membership or union 
activities. 
 
4.2.2 Progress requirements 
4.2.2.1 If one or more independent and active trade unions exist in the sector and the region, FLO 
expects that the workers will be represented by (a) trade union(s) and that the workers will be 
covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 
4.2.2.2 If no independent and active union exists in the region and the sector, all the worker’s will 
democratically elect a worker’s committee, which represents them, discusses with the 
organisation and defends their interests. This committee negotiates with the organisation an 
agreement on the conditions of employment, covering all aspects normally covered by a 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 
4.2.2.3 The representation and participation of the workers is improved through training activities. These are 
also aimed at improving the workers’ awareness of the principles of Fairtrade. 
4.2.2.4 If no union is present, the organisation and the workers’ committee gets into a process of 
consultation with the national union federation(s) and the International Union of Food, 
Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF) 
or the respective International Trade Secretariat about improvement of the workers’ 





4.3 Conditions of employment 
FLO follows ILO Plantation Convention 110, ILO Conventions 100 on equal remuneration and 111 on 
discrimination. All employees must work under fair conditions of employment. The producer 
organisation must pay wages in line with or exceeding national laws and agreements on minimum 
wages or the regional average. 
 
4.3.1 Minimum requirements 
4.3.1.1 Salaries are in line with or exceeding regional average and official minimum wages for 
similar occupations. The employer will specify wages for all functions. 
4.3.1.2 Payment must be made regularly and in legal tender and properly documented. 
 
4.3.2 Progress requirements 
4.3.2.1 Regarding other conditions of employment like maternity leave, social security provisions, non-monetary 
benefits, etc. at least the provisions as laid out in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or the Agreement signed 
between the workers' committee must be fulfilled. 
4.3.2.2 All workers are employed under legally binding labour contracts. 
4.3.2.3 The organisation works towards all permanent workers having the benefits of a provident 
fund or pension scheme. 
4.3.2.4 An adequate sick leave regulation is put in place. 
4.3.2.5 A working hours and overtime regulation is put in place. 
4.3.2.6 Salaries are gradually increased to levels above the regional average and official minimum. 
4.3.2.7 Differences in the conditions of employment for casual, seasonal and permanent workers are 
progressively diminished. 
 
4.4 Occupational Health & Safety 
FLO follows ILO Convention 155 which aims “to prevent accidents and injury to health arising out of, 
linked with or occurring in the course of work, by minimising, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
causes of hazards inherent in the working environment.” 
 
4.4.1 Minimum requirements 
4.4.1.1 Workplaces, machinery and equipment are safe and without risk to health. FLO may require that an 
inspection is carried out by a competent authority or independent inspection agency. 
4.4.1.2 The following persons are not allowed to work with the application of pesticides: persons 
younger than 18 years, pregnant or nursing women, persons with incapacitated mental 
conditions; persons with chronic, hepatic or renal diseases, and persons with diseases in the 
respiratory ways. 
 
4.4.2 Progress requirements 
4.4.2.1 Among the workers’ representatives, a person must be nominated who can be consulted and who can 
address health and safety issues with the organisation. 




disposal of these. They are actively informed of all relevant information on the product they 
are handling by the producer organisation. This information is provided in the local language. 
4.4.2.3 Adequate personal protective equipment of good quality is available and appropriate, 
especially for the use of agrochemicals. Workers handling agrochemicals must use it. 
4.4.2.4 Workers’ capability and awareness of the chemicals they are using, relevant health protection and first 
aid are improved through training. 
4.4.2.5 Establishment of a occupational health and safety committee with the participation of 
workers. 





Appendix 2. Fair Trade Standards for Coffee  
(FLO: 2005b) 
 
1. Product description 
The Fairtrade Standards cover two species of coffee. 
 
Coffea arabica - Arabica coffee1 
Coffea arabica was first described by Linnaeus in 1753. The best known varieties are 'Typica' and 'Bourbon'. The 
average arabica plant is a large bush with dark-green oval leaves. It is genetically different from other coffee 
species, having four sets of chromosomes rather than two. The fruits are oval and mature in 7 to 9 months; they 
usually contain two flat seeds (the coffee beans) - when only one bean develops it is called a peaberry. Arabica 
coffee is grown throughout Latin America, in Central and East Africa, in India and to some extent in Indonesia. 
 
Coffea canephora - Robusta coffee 
 
The term 'robusta' is actually the name of a widely grown variety of this species. It is a robust shrub or small tree 
growing up to 10 metres in height, but with a shallow root system. The fruits are rounded and take up to 11 
months to mature; the seeds are oval in shape and smaller than those of C. arabica. Robusta coffee is grown in 
West and Central Africa, throughout South-East Asia and to some extent in Brazil, where it is known as 
Conillon. 
 
2. Procure a Long Term and Stable Relationship 
 
Buyers and sellers will procure to establish a long term and stable relationship in which the rights and interests 
of both are mutually respected. Buyer and seller will sign contractual agreements for the first part of the season 
and a letter of intent for the rest of the season, to be confirmed by purchase contracts as the harvest progresses, 
which stipulate basic conditions such as: volume, quality, procedures to establish differentials and fix prices, 
shipment schedules, etc. 
 
3. International Customary Conditions 
 
All other customary conditions applicable to any international transaction will apply, such as the 
conditions of the European Contract of Coffee, latest edition (hereinafter to be referred to as ECC conditions), 
unless overruled by any of the special FLO-International conditions as specified herein. 
 
4. Pricing and Premium 
4.1 Buyers shall pay producer organizations at least the Fairtrade minimum price as set by FLO 
(see the price table further below). The Fairtrade minimum prices vary according to the type 





4.2 In addition to the Fairtrade minimum price the buyers shall pay a Fairtrade premium as set by 
FLO at 5 US$-cents per pound of coffee. 
 
4.3 For certified organic coffee an additional premium of 15 US$-cents per pound green coffee 
will be due, on top of the Fairtrade minimum price or the market reference price respectively 
as determined under point 4.4. 
 
4.4 If the market price is higher than the Fairtrade minimum price, the market price shall apply. 
The Fairtrade premium is paid on top of the market price. 
For Arabicas the reference market price shall be based on the New York "C" contract. The 
price shall be established in US$-cents per pound, plus or minus the prevailing differential for 
the relevant quality, basis F.O.B. origin, net shipped weight. 
For Robustas the reference market price shall be based on the London "LCE" contract. The 
price shall be established in US-dollars per metric tonne, plus or minus the prevailing 
differential for the relevant quality, basis F.O.B. origin, net shipped weight. 
When by legal regulation, all coffee has to be passed through the auction, importer and 
exporter will agree upon a reasonable margin for the exporter to cover his costs. 
The following Fairtrade minimum prices, including quality differentials apply: (all prices and 
premium in US$-cents per pound F.O.B. port of origin) 
 
Fairtrade minimum price and Premium information 
 
 




 conventional organic Conventional and 
organic 
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* Semi-washed or pulped natural coffee are regarded as washed coffee. 
 
Payment shall be net cash against a full set of documents on first presentation. The documents to be presented 




• In the case of contracts with fixed prices the buyer shall make available up to 60% of the contract value, on the 
request of the seller. 
 
• In the case of unfixed prices the buyer shall make available up to 60% of the estimated contract 
value on request of the seller, as long as buyer and seller agree upon a mechanism that guarantees 
the contract value(s) will cover the pre-financing, e.g. by a ‘stop/loss’ clause. In the absence of 
such a mechanism, seller is entitled only to request pre-financing of up to 60% of the FLO International 
minimum price. 
 
• Pre-finance must allow access for producer organizations to cash in order to buy from their 
members. The payment instruments (cash, L/C Red Clause, etc.) will be arranged in the contract, 
by mutual agreement. 
 
• In principle the pre-finance is meant for the first-level organizations, but in practice it is linked to the 
contracting parties (the sellers and the buyers). If the exporter is not a member of the register he will receive the 
pre-finance, but beforehand the exporter and the FLO-CR partner organization have to agree upon the handling 
of the pre-financing money and the fulfilment of the contract. 
 
• In case of several shipments the spread of the pre-finance must be fixed in the contracts. It is not always 
necessary to pre-finance the whole amount before the first shipment. Pre-finance must be adapted to the real 
needs of the producer organization. 
 
• If an importer requires the extension of the shipment schedule beyond the limits of sound 
commercial practice of the producer organization (three months after the harvest), the real costs of storage, 
interest and insurance must be covered (by the importer) in the terms of the contract. This rule is not applicable 
for those organizations in in whose respective countries exist specific export regulations which make the above 
unworkable. 
